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BALANCING FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION
WITH STATE SOVEREIGNTY
MATHEW

D. STAVER*

Mathew D. Staver writes about the Abstention Doctrine. The Article provides an analysis of the AntiInjunction Act and the applicability of the Pullman,
Younger, Rooker-Feldman, Brillhart, and Colorado
River Abstention Doctrines, paying particular attention to how each doctrine affects a litigator's practice.
Most litigators have a vague memory of the Abstention
Doctrine from their law school civil procedure course. Seemingly unimportant, judged by the amount of time devoted to
the doctrine in law school, the practitioner may be surprised
the first time an astute adversary raises the Abstention
Doctrine in a motion to dismiss. Hoping to quickly respond
to the motion and move on to the merits of the case, the advocate may be dismayed to learn that there is an entire body
of law on the subject. The Abstention Doctrine is a piecemeal theory. Part of the doctrine has been codified. However,
most of the Abstention Doctrine is spread throughout a
patchwork of case law where it has been decompartmentalized and subsequently identified by case names. 1
* President and General Counsel of Liberty Counsel, a civil liberties
education and legal defense organization; BA, 1980, Southern College; M.A.,
1982, Andrews University; J.D., 1987, University of Kentucky. Mr. Staver was
lead counsel in Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane) and Hoover v. Wagner, 47
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1995), which gave rise to this article. He wishes to thank
Rick H. Nelson, Nicole Arfaras Kerr, and Lara M. Johnson.
1. For a brief comparison of abstention doctrines, see CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 (1988). For an argument toward reorienting the abstention doctrines, see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1049 (1994). For an analysis of Burford abstention applied to RICO, see
Tracy Doherty et al., Niath Survey of White Collar Crime: Racketeer Influenced
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At the heart of the Abstention Doctrine is the balance
between state and federal sovereignty. This balance is sometimes referred to as federalism or comity. The Abstention
Doctrine essentially requires federal courts to step aside in
order to allow the state adjudicatory process to run its
course. The federal plaintiff must be familiar with abstention issues or run the risk of protracted litigation in federal
court which may eventually be halted when abstention is
raised. This Article will review various aspects of the Abstention Doctrine including the Anti-Injunction Act, the Pullman, Younger, Rooker-Feldman, Brillhart, and Colorado
River Abstention Doctrines. After discussing the various
Abstention Doctrines, this article will then apply these doctrines to the case of Cheffer v. McGregor. 2 The plaintiff in
Cheffer filed a complaint in federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state court injunction. This
classic federal-state conflict lies at the heart of the Abstention Doctrine.
I. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

The Anti-Injunction Act was first codified in 1793.3 The
Act provides that "[a] court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to state proceedings in the state court
except as expressly authorized by an act of Congress or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."4
and Corrupt Organizations, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 769 (1994). Finally, for an
examination of the conflict between Colorado River Abstention and legislative
enactments, see David J. McCarty, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor
When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (1985).
2. 6 F.3d at 705.
3. See Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, 1 Stat. 335, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1997). The Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 provided in part that a "writ of
injunction [shall not] be granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in
any court of a state," thus establishing a general prohibition against federal
intervention. [d.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997). Passed by Congress in 1793, the precise origins
of the Act are shrouded in obscurity, but the basic purpose was to prevent
"needless friction between state and federal courts." Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 233 (1972) (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec.
Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940». The law remained unchanged until amended in 1874
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In Mitchum v. Foster,5 the United States Supreme
Court held that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
specifically excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act; therefore,
the statute does not ban federal courts from enjoining enforcement of a state court order.6

to permit federal courts to stay state court procedings that interfered with the
administration of federal bankruptcy procedings. The present wording was
adopted in 1948. The Supreme Court then recognized additional exceptions to
the Act under at least six other federal laws: (1) legislation providing for
removal of litigation from state to federal courts under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-50;
(2) legislation limiting the liability of shipowners under 46 U.S.C. § 185; (3)
legislation providing for federal interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2361; (4)
legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages under 11 U.S.C.
§ 203; (5) legislation governing federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28
U.S.C. § 2251; and (6) legislation providing for control of prices under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(a), 56 Stat. Section 205(a) expired
in 1947. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 234-35. In addition to the above exceptions,
Congress recognized other exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. One such exception is the "in rem" exception where a federal court is permitted to enjoin a
state court proceeding in order to protect its jurisdiction of a res over which it
first obtained jurisdiction. A second is the "relitigation" exception permitting a
federal court to enjoin relitigation in a state court of issues already decided in
federal court. A third exception permits a federal injunction against a state
court proceeding when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States
itself, or a federal agencY asserting "superior federal interests." [d. at 235-36.
5. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, a state court proceeding was brought
to close the defendant's bookstore under a state public nuisance law. The state
court entered a preliminary injunction closing the bookstore. The defendant
then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida, alleging a violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The federal plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory
relief against the state court proceedings on the ground that the state law was
unconstitutional. The district court refused to enjoin the state court proceeding
because it found that federal injunctive relief was barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that suits brought
under § 1983 are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. See id. at 243.
6. See id. In reversing the district court by finding that actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not within the 'expressly authorized' exception
of the anti-injunction statute, then a federal equity court is wholly
without power to grant any relief in a § 1983 suit seeking to stay a
state court proceeding. In short, if a § 1983 action is not an 'expressly
authorized' statutory exception, the anti-injunction law absolutely prohibits in such an action all federal equitable intervention in a pending
state court proceeding, whether civil or criminal, and regardless of
how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be.
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 229. The Court found that without a § 1983 exception,
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The Mitchum Court noted that Congress envisioned
§ 1983 would alter the relationship between the state
and federal governments.
[The] legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with
respect to the protection of federally created rights; it
was concerned that state instrumentalities could not
protect those rights; it realized that state officers
might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of
those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had
prevailed in the late 18th century when the antiinjunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights - to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law,
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly
authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in
§ 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a 'suit in
equity' as one of the means of redress. And this Court
long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief
against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and
irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights.
For these reasons we conclude that under the criteria
established in our previous decisions construing the
anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress
that falls within the 'expressly authorized' exception
of that law. 7

the federal judiciary would be impermissibly limited.
7. Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted).
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The Mitchum decision addressed only the applicability
of the Anti-Injunction Act, not the Younger Abstention Doctrine.8 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar a federal court injunction against enforcement of a state court order. 9 In
Machesky, the federal court was faced with a state court
injunction that prohibited civil rights protestors from demonstrating within three hundred feet of certain businesses. 10
In the suit against the state court judge, the federal court
enjoined enforcement of the state court order. Finding that
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply, the court noted:
"Where the interests in comity collide with the paramount

8. In discussing the Younger decision, Mitchum pointed out that during the
previous term the Court had "eschewed any reliance on the [Anti-Injunction]
statute in reversing the judgment, basing [the Younger] decision instead upon ... 'Our Federalism'." Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 230. Later in Mitchum, the
Court again insisted that its decision was in no way meant to "qualify . . . the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." [d. at 243. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, stressed in his concurring opinion
that the Mitchum decision "does nothing to 'question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism. m [d. at 225 (Burger, J. concurring).
Burger suggested that on remand the lower court, "before reaching a decision
on the merits of [the] appellant's claim, should properly consider whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar to those invoked in
Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction against the state . . . " [d. at
244. Professor Stravitz argues that the Court specifically created the Younger
Abstention Doctrine in anticipation of the Court's holding in Mitchum, because
without Younger, a complete exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would result
in unrestrained federal court intervention in state court proceedings. See
Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co.
v. Texaco, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 997, 1027-28 (1989). However, the Mitchum
Court cited Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942);
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 312 U.S. 157 (1943); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951); and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), to support the
proposition that the Younger Abstention Doctrine's foundation was laid many
years prior to 1971.
9. See Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
10. See id. at 290.
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institutional interests protected by the First Amendment,
comity must yield.,,11 The court granted federal injunctive
relief against enforcement of the state court order.
In Munoz v. County of Imperial,12 a California state
court enjoined the selling of water for use outside the county. Munoz was not a party to the underlying state court
action. In granting the request for federal injunctive relief
under § 1983 enjoining enforcement of the state court order,
the federal court acknowledged that Munoz was not a party
to the state court action and could do nothing to appeal or
otherwise influence the result of the state court proceeding.13 "There [were] no means by which [Munoz could] challenge the [state court injunction];" so therefore, federal injunctive relief was not precluded by the Anti-Injunction
Act. 14
II. THE PULLMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Although the Abstention Doctrine has its roots in English and early American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
first acknowledged the doctrine in the 194115 decision of
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman CO. 16

A. The Background of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine
In Chisholm v. Georgia,17 the Supreme Court ruled
that states may be sued by its citizens. The Court's opinion
sparked an immediate backlash. Some argued that the
states might face bankruptcy if they could be sued for damages. In response to this "startling and unexpected"18 deci11. [d.

12. 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
13. In reviewing whether to grant injunctive relief based on a violation of
§ 1983, the court must determine that the act sought to be enjoined involves
state action. A state court injunction constitutes state action. See, e.g., New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Gresham Park Community v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981);
Henry v. First Nat'} Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
14. Munoz, 510 F. Supp. at 885.
15. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
16. 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
17. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
18. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 111 (1890). Justice Bradley used this lan-
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sion announced in Chisholm, Congress proposed the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state."19
The Supreme Court interpreted' the Eleventh Amendment to forbid all individual suits brought in federal court
against any state regardless of citizenship.20 For approximately a century a wronged plaintiff could not initiate a
federal suit against a state.
However, the 1908 Ex parte Younlfl decision dramatically changed the judicial landscape by allowing federallitigants to sue states for alleged constitutional violations. The
Supreme Court pierced the previously impervious shield of
state sovereign immunity by creating an exception to the
Eleventh Amendment. 22 The Court held that while a state
could not be sued by one of its citizens, an officer of the state
acting in an unconstitutional manner could be sued by one
of its citizens.23 Consequently, the result of the Court's

guage to describe both the political and intellectual response to the Chisholm
decision should the Constitution be interpreted to forbid suits against states by
citizens of other states but not citizens of the same state.
19. For a modem historical examination of the Eleventh Amendment, see
William A Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 11th Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv.
1033, 1058-62 (1983).
20. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Ex parte Young, shareholders of a railroad company challenged, in federal court, Minnesota legislation that fixed railroad
rates, alleging the legislation was confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction which, among other
things, prohibited the Attorney General of Minnesota, Edward Young, from
enforcing the legislation. Young attempted to force compliance with the new
rate, and the court held him in contempt.
22. The Court's creation of the exception presents an amusing example of a
judicially-created legal fiction. For a discussion of incorrectly applied Federalist
principles and a neo-modern look at the Eleventh Amendment, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481-84 (1987).
23. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60. Specifically, the Court said:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be
so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act
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opinion was that, even without their consent, states could be
sued merely by naming the official who engaged in unconstitutional behavior.
Congress sought to ameliorate the effects of Ex parte
Young by restricting preliminary injunctions and by requiring that petitions for particular types of preliminary injunctive relief against state officials be heard by a three-judge
panel of the district court. The decisions of the three-judge
panel were directly appealable to the United States Supreme
Court. 24

B. Pullman Abstention: The Case
In 1941, the Supreme Court limited Ex parte Young
when it handed down Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman CO.25 The facts of Pullman involved a Texas Railroad
Co~mission order regarding who could be in charge of train
cars for sleeping passengers. In Texas, the majority of trains
pulled more than one sleeping car under the charge of caucasian conductors.26 However, in some areas of Texas where
train traffic was less busy, trains only included one car for
sleeping passengers. These single sleeping cars were generally under the charge of black porters. 27
The Texas Railroad Commission ordered all sleeping
cars be placed under the charge of conductors, not porters,
and the Pullman Company, along with other railroad companies, brought suit in federal COurt.28 The Texas Railroad

to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of,
and one which does not affect, the state in its sovereign or govern·
mental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to enforce
a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional.
Id. at 159.
24. On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel requirement was abolished.
See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982».
25. 312 U.S. at 496 (1941). For a thorough analysis of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, see Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974).
26. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497.
27. See id. The Court notes that "[als is well known, porters on Pullmans
are colored and conductors are white." Id.
28. See id. at 497-98. The order read in pertinent part '"no sleeping car shall
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Commission's order was assailed as a violation of Texas law
and the United States Constitution, specifically, the Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Commerce Clauses. 29 A threejudge panel prohibited enforcement of the order. 30 The federal court found that the Texas Railroad Commission lacked
authority to promulgate the order.31 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the threejudge panel should have abstained from reaching the merits
of the case. 32
1. Analyzing the Pullman Holding

In Pullman, the Supreme Court reiterated the general
rule that federal courts ought to avoid reaching a constitutional question if the case can properly be resolved by addressing the state issue. 33 However, the Court not only
avoided reaching the constitutional question, it abstained
from deciding the case based on state law. According to the
Court, since the Texas law was "far from clear,"34 the Texas
Supreme Court, and not the federal courts, should first be
afforded the opportunity to interpret state law. 35 The Court

be operated on any line of railroad in the State of Texas . . . unless such cars
are continuously in the charge of an employee . . . having the rank and position of Pullman conductor'." [d. (ellipsis in original).
29. See id. at 498.
30. See id.
31. The Texas Railroad Commission found power to promulgate the order
under Tex. Civil Code Ann. § 6445, which granted the authority "to prevent
any and all . . . abuses" in conducting the business of the railroad. See PullI7Uln, 312 U.S. at 498, n.1.
32. See Pulll7Uln, 312 U.S. at 501-02.
33. See id. at 498. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (refusing to reach the constitutional question in instances where
other grounds were present through which the Court could settle the controversy). See also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909)
(stressing the proper course is to avoid reaching the constitutional question if
possible unless "important reasons" support a deviation)..
34. Pulll7Uln, 312 U.S. at 499.
35. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter commented: "Reading the
Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special competence
in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent judgment
regarding the application of that law to the present situation." [d. Had the
state law been unambiguous, the Supreme Court likely .would have decided the
case on state law. The Pulll7Uln doctrine is usually invoked when the state law
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reasoned that federal courts risked interpreting state law
inaccurately when the law is ambiguous and the state courts
have not interpreted its meaning. 36 An inaccurate interpretation by federal courts could later be contradicted by the
state courts, thus wasting judicial resources and possibly
reqUlnng subsequent federal intervention. 37 Therefore,
when confronted with an ambiguous state la~ which has
not been interpreted by the state courts, the federal courts
should "exercise their wise discretion by staying their
hands,"39 meanwhile retaining jurisdiction to rehear the
constitutional issue should the need arise. 40
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when
the state law is clear and unambiguous, when every application of the state law is unconstitutional, or when the state

in question is ambiguous and the state courts have not had the opportunity to
interpret the law.
36. The Court stated that a federal court's decision on an ambiguous state
law which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts would be merely "a
forecast" instead of an accurate determination of the law. Railroad Comm'n of
Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
37. A "tentative answer" to the state law question could be "displaced tomorrow by a state" court's decision, resulting in a waste of the "resources of equity." [d. at 500.
38. The use of the term "ambiguous" should not be confused with "vague." A
federal court may invalidate a state law because it is vague or overbroad. However, if a state law is susceptible to more than one interpretation with one
interpretation rendering it unconstitutional and another rendering it constitutional, then the federal courts should consider abstaining until the state courts
have the opportunity to interpret its meaning. However, if it appears the state
courts either had the opportunity to interpret itsmeaning, or would probably
refrain from interpreting the law, the federal court should not abstain.
39. With shades of Justice Black's later soliloquy on "Our Federalism," in
Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Justice Frankfurter paid homage to the
necessity of giving due regard to the independence of the state and federal
systems whereby state governments should be afford the opportunity to order
their affairs without federal intervention. See Pullman, 312 U.S. 500-01. That
the two discourses are similar in rationale is further underscored by Justice
O'Connor's discussion of "comity and federalism" concerns in weighing whether
federal courts should abstain based on Pullman. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02. Although Justice Frankfurter did not
direct the lower court to retain jurisdiction for that specific purpose, the evolution of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine dictates that federal courts do so. See,
e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 10
(1983); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).

HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1152 1997

1997]

Balancing Federal Court Intervention

1153

courts have had the opportunity to interpret the state law
but have not done so. The principle behind Pullman rests
upon the rule of statutory construction that a state or federal statute is presumed constitutional. When a state statute
is ambiguous to the point that one interpretation of its application would be unconstitutional, but another interpretation
would be constitutional, then federal courts should allow
state courts the first opportunity to interpret the law. 41
Pullman obviously does not apply when a federal statute is
at issue.
2. The Expansion of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Committee v. S.F. Windsor,42 partially clarified whether state or federal courts should address a
constitutional challenge to state law. Windsor involved a
federal suit to enjoin the enforcement of an Alabama state
statute which denied employment benefits to public employees who joined labor unions. 48 The United States Supreme
Court ultimately abstained from reaching the constitutional
question. 44 The Court reasoned that the Alabama Supreme

41. The Court has been inconsistent when deciding whether Pullman is appropriate or whether the state law is unclear. Compare Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (finding Pullman abstention to be inappropriate by the Ninth Circuit because the statute was
unclear, but the Supreme Court failed to address it in deciding the case) with
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (ruling that Pullman should be
applied because the state did have the opportunity to construe the state statute, despite a lower court's finding that the statute was unconstitutional). For a
discussion of the inadequacies of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, see Martha
A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977) (argu·
ing that the doctrine is not worth the costs inflicted upon the litigant).
42. 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam).
43. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama Code § 720 (1953) abridged
their freedom of speech and association in addition to violating the Due Pro·
cess, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four·
teenth Amendment. See id.
44. The case was batted up and down both the federal and state court sys·
tems before the Supreme Court's final a<ljudication. First, a three·judge panel
abstained from reaching the constitutional question. The Supreme Court af·
firmed the abstention. The plaintiffs then commenced an action in the Alabama
state courts, eventually reaching the Alabama Supreme Court. See Windsor, 353
U.S. at 365. Next, the plaintiffs resubmitted the case to the three·judge panel,
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Court "might have construed the statute in a different manner" if the court had been presented with the constitutional
claim. 45 The fact that the Alabama court did not have the
opportunity to construe the statute in light of the constitutional claim meant that any decision by a federal court
would result in an insufficient bona fide interpretation of
Alabama state law. 46
The Windsor decision caused confusion which remained
unsettled until 1964 when the Supreme Court handed down
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. 47
The England Court settled what procedures should be followed if the federal plaintiff desired to preserve the right to
a choice of forum. 46 The Court held that a federal plaintiff
remanded to a state court proceeding is not forced to litigate
the constitutional question in state court.49 The federal
plaintiff is only required to "inform [the state court] what
[the] federal claims are, so that· the state statute may be
but the panel dismissed the case rmding the issue was resolved by the Alabama courts. The plaintiffs again sought review by the United States Supreme
Court. See ill. The facts of this case provide the greatest fodder for criticism of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine. The plaintiffs, exhausted by two fruitless
trips to the United States Supreme Court, abandoned their claim after they
were directed to pursue their claim a second time in the Alabama state courts.
See Martha A Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1086 n.65 (1974).
45. Windsor, 353 U.S. at 366.
46. See id.
47. 375 U.S. 411 (1960). The Court's decision in Windsor appeared to remove
from the federal litigant the right to a choice of forum. As noted later, the
England Court clarified this matter and preserved the litigant's right to choose
a forum.
48. England's facts involved a group of chiropractors who filed suit to enjoin
enforcement of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act as applied to them, alleging
the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See England, 375 U.S. at 412. A
three-judge panel abstained per Pullman. A state action then commenced resulting in a ruling against the chiropractors. See ill. at 414. The plaintiffs then
returned to the three-judge panel for resubmission of their constitutional issues,
but the district court dismissed the action, finding that the case had been resolved by the Louisiana court system. See id. However, the district court
viewed the case as illustrative of the predicament in which a federal plaintiff
can become caught in the web of the Windsor decision. See ill. at 414-15. See
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.
La. 1961), rev'd and remanded, England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r,
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
49. England, 375 U.S. at 419.
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construed 'in light of those claims. "50 Compliance with England can be accomplished by the federal plaintiff clearly
stating for the record that, although the constitutional
claims are exposed in the state court proceedings, they are
exposed solely for the purpose of resolving the statute in
light of the constitutional issues, not to litigate the constitutional issues in state court since the plaintiff intends to
return to federal court to relitigate the constitutional
claims. 51 The federal litigant's right to a choice of forum
was therefore preserved by the Court's decision in England. 52

III.

THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRTINE

In addition to the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, the
federal litigant must also consider the Younger Abstention
Doctrine which was unveiled by the Court in Younger v.
Harris. 53 The Younger Abstention Doctrine is based upon a
long tradition of federalism and comity growing out of English and early American jurisprudence.54
50. England, 375 U.S. at 420. However, the Court generously exempted the
England plaintiffs from this requirement because the Court found that their
confusion regarding the Windsor decision prompted them to submit their constitutional claims to the state court and that their confusion was justifiable. See
id. at 422.
51. See id. at 42l.
52. However, a federal litigant is not prohibited from litigating the constitutional claims in state court. The Court took strides to stress that if the litigant "freely and without reservation" submits the constitutional issues to the
state court for the state court's decision, the litigant may do so. The litigant
will be bound by the state court decision and cannot avoid a contrary decision
by re-litigating the issues in federal court. See England, 375 U.S. at 419.
53. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
54. See, e.g., Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate Foundations of the Younger
Abstention Doctrine, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 311 (1990); George D. Brown,
When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide - Rethinking Younger Ab·
stention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 114 (1990); James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comi·
ty Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(1994); David Logan, Judicial Federalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L.
REv. 453 (1988); Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, (1984); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985); Donald H. Zeigler, An
Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to
Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 266 (1976).
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A The Background of the Younger Abstention Doctrine

The seeds of the Abstention Doctrine have their roots in
English jurisprudence, where courts of equity were prohibited from interfering with criminal proceedings. As early as
1888, in the case of In re Sawyer,55 the United States Supreme Court refused to intervene in a prospective criminal
proceeding. 56 The Sawyer Court discussed historical English
rules for courts of equity and cited the Anti-Injunction Act57
as a basis for declining to intervene. 58
In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Young,59
rejecting the argument that federal courts lacked the jurisdiction to enjoin prospective state criminal proceedings.
Creating a slightly more permissive intervention standard,60 the Court declared the contested state statute unconstitutional.
In 1926, the Court again tightened the abstention standard vis-a-vis the holding of Fenner v. Boykin. 61 In discussing Ex parte Young, the Fenner Court noted that while federal courts may enjoin state proceedings, they may do so
only under "extraordinary circumstances where the danger
of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. »62 Hence,

55. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
56. See id. at 209-10, 219-20.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
58. See id. at 220.
59. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60. The Court held that "officers of the state . . . who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the . . . Constitution,
may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." Id. at 155-56.
Although the opinion attempted to reconcile the glaring disparity between In re
Sawyer and Ex parte Young, the Court did so ineffectively, relegating the discussion of In re Sawyer to two anemic sentences. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
at 162. The two cases can only be reconciled if Ex parte Young is viewed a8 a
judicial relaxation of Sawyer's firm principle of non-intervention.
61. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
62. Id. at 243. The Court stated that the criminal defendant must "first set
up and rely upon his defense in the state courts" before resorting to federal
court. Id. at 244. Ex parte Young held that assertion of constitutional defenses
in the state proceeding was not an adequate remedy at law. 209 U.S. at 16465.
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the Fenner Court added a definitive prong upon which later
analysis would turn in measuring irreparable harm. 63
The Court, in 1943, laid another brick in the foundation
of the Younger Abstention Doctrine. In Douglas v. City of
Jeannette,64 the Court declined to intervene in a state court
proceeding,65 despite the fact that the Court could have decided the case without reaching the Abstention Doctrine. 66
Instead, citing Fenner,67 the Court held that the federal
plaintiffs had not suffered irreparable injury because they
could assert their constitutional defense in the state court
proceeding. The Court found that intervention was unnecessary and inappropriate.
The 1965 decision of Dombrowski v. Pfister66 marked a
relaxed era in the evolution of Abstention Doctrine. The
Court addressed the Anti-Injunction Act,69 noting that the
63. Younger quotes Fenner, noting that the "irreparable injury" must be "both
great and immediate." Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243 (1926). Before the Younger Court gave the four·page Fenner opinion a role in jurisprudential history, Fenner languished in ignominy. Until the
Younger decision, the Court's earlier opinion in Ex parte Young dominated abstention jurisprudence.
64. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
65. The state action in question involved the enforcement of Municipal Ordinance No. 60, which prohibited the distribution of wares, merchandise, or other
articles without first obtaining a license. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 159 (1943). The plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses who had previously
been prosecuted and were then threatened with additional prosecution under
the ordinance for distributing religious literature.
66. The Court handed down Murdock v. Pennsylvania on the same day as
Douglas 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Both cases involved the exact same ordinance and
some of the same plaintiffs. In Murdock, the Court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional as applied. See id. at 115. However, although the Court in
Douglas mentioned the Murdock holding, the Court did not decide the Douglas
case based on the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at
159. Rather, the Court chose to abstain. See id. at 163. In Douglas, the Supreme Court upheld a district court's refusal to enjoin application of a city
ordinance to religious solicitation, even though on the same day the Supreme
Court in Murdock found the statute unconstitutional as applied to a criminal
conviction. The Supreme Court reasoned that since injunctive relief looks to the
future, and it was not alleged that the state courts and prosecutors would fail
to enforce the Murdock ruling, the Court found nothing to justify an injunction.
See id. at 165.
67. 271 U.S. at 240. The Court also cited Davis & Farnum Manufacturing
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903).
68. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2; 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997). Many of
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Act only bars suits involving cases already pending in the
state court, but not injunctions against the commencement
of state court proceedings. 70 Dombrowski noted that in cases involving First Amendment allegations of overbreadth,
abstention is not proper. 71 Dombrowski appeared to signal a
new direction for federal court litigants facing the Abstention Doctrine.

B. Younger Abstention: The Case
1. Analyzing the Younger Holding

The Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris 72
tightened the Dombrowski standard and clarified the Court's
analysis. The federal plaintiff13 in Younger requested and
the previous Supreme Court decisions either failed to specifically discuss the
Anti-Injunction Act or did so only in general terms. Although at the time of
the In re Sawyer decision the only exception to the Anti-Injunction Act was a
case "authorized by a bankrupt act," later amendments to the Anti-Injunction
Act made provision for three exceptions to the general rule against federal
court intervention: (1) expressly authorized by Act of Congress; (2) necessary in
aid of a federal court's jurisdiction; or (3) as needed to protect or effectuate a
federal court's judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997).
70. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 484 n.2.
71. See id. at 486. In Douglas, the Supreme Court found abstention was
appropriate in part because of an assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution would generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights. 319
U.S. at 157. However, in the case of an overly broad statute which chills free
expression, this assumption is not warranted. According to Dombrowski, the
threat of sanctions may deter free speech, and therefore in the context of First
Amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court has "not required that all of those
subject to ove~broad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free
expression - of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights - might be the loser." Id. at 486.
72. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court decided five companion cases on the same
day. In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), the Court reversed the lower
court's decision citing a lack of irreparable injury to plaintiffs. The Court in
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), reversed, based in part on Younger's
principles, the lower court's suppression order. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971), the Court held the same policies articulated in Younger regarding
injunctive relief should be utilized in determining whether to issue declaratory
relief. Both Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971), and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971), were per curiam reversals based on abstention rationale.
73. Although John Harris was the party indicted and the original federal
plaintiff, Jim Dan, Diane Hirsch, and Farrell Broslawsky intervened in the suit,
claiming that Harris' prosecution would cause them to "suffer immediate and

HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1158 1997

1997]

Balancing Federal Court Intervention

1159

received injunctive relief14 from a three-judge district court
panel'5 which enjoined the district attorney76 from prosecuting Harris under an unconstitutional statute. 77
Writing for the majority, Justice Black reversed the
lower court's decision based on sensitivity with respect to
equity,7S comity,79 and federalism. so The general rule pro-

irreparable injury." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39 (1971). However, the
Court held the intervenors lacked a genuine controversy and therefore had no
standing to join the action. See id. at 42.
74. The federal plaintiff also requested that the district court "grant 'such
other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper'" which, in a
footnote, the Supreme Court stated was an improper request for declaratory
relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 39 n.2.
75. Before 1976, constitutional challenges to state laws required the assembly
of a special panel of three judges. On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel
requirement was abolished. See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. § 1119 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982».
76. Evelle J. Younger was the state district attorney from Los Angeles County. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.
77. The statute in question was the California Criminal Syndicalism Act,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982). In Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, but later specifically overruled the Whitney
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447·49 (1969) (per curiam), by holding a similar statute, the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, repugnant to the Federal Constitution.
78. Longstanding equitable principles of English jurisprudence, dating as far
back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dictate that courts of equity
should not interfere with criminal proceedings. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory
and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court
and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REv. 591, 606 (1975). Equitable intervention requires the court to consider: (1) whether the party in the
criminal proceeding has an adequate remedy at common law; and (2) whether
the party will suffer irreparable injury if the court denies equitable relief and
refuses to interfere with the criminal proceeding. See id. at 600-04. AJJ Justice
Black's citation to the theory of equitable jurisprudence denotes, these two pil·
lars of equity jurisprudence are still utilized in American jurisprudence in deciding whether to exercise equitable powers. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
79. Comity encompasses the notion that, based on judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and effect to the laws and
judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction. See Warren, Federal and
State Court Interference, 43 lIARv. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930).
80. The Court entwines the concepts of comity and federalism so tightly that
it is virtually impossible to discern where one concept begins and the other
ends. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Justice Black terms "Our Federalism" as
the "recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free to
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vides that federal courts should not interfere with pending,
ongoing state criminal proceedings except under "special
circumstances."Bl Special circumstancesB2 include prosecutorial bad faith83 or blatant and flagrant unconstitutional
construction. 84 However, the Court expressed no opinion
"about the circumstances under which federal courts may act
when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the
time the federal proceeding is begun."B5
The Court held that although Harris had an actual
controverst6 with the state because he was actually facing

perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at 44. Justice
Black's eloquent description of our federalist form of government has ignited
heated debate among legal scholars regarding the proper amount of deference
for states' rights shown by the Court via utilization of abstention doctrines. See
Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of
the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal
Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1976); Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention
Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 997
(1989); but see Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of
Federal Deference to State Court Proceedings A Response to Professor Stravitz,
58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173 (1989). Cf. Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate
Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1987) (arguing that only states which fail to follow the federal design of the law should
face federal court intervention).
81. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. The Court later states that the "normal thing to
do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts
is not to issue such injunctions." Id. at 45. This appears to contradict the
Court's practice prior to the Younger decision when the Warren Court permitted
intervention in state court criminal prosecutions. See Martin H. Redish, The
Warren Court, the Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1983) (comparing the two Chief Justices' legacies for willingness to intervene and stray into activist territory).
82. In a footnote, the Younger Court discussed its holding in Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), noting that declaratory relief is also improper
when a prosecution involving a challenge to a state statute is pending in state
court at the time the federal suit is initiated. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 n.2.
83. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-50, 56. Prosecutorial exception is akin to a
glass house, devoid of protection. See C. Keith Wingate, The Bad Faith Harass·
ment Exception to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REv.
LmGATION 123 (1986).
84. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37 at 56 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,
402 (1941».
85. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. The lack of ongoing state proceedings involving
the federal plaintiff is a major exception to the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
86. The Court first defined "case or controversy" in Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 253-54 (1911) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
and In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 FED. 241 (1887», in discussing the re-
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prosecution, the other three plaintiff-intervenors did not
have an actual controversy and lacked standing. 87 Intervenors Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky merely alleged they felt
inhibited from exercising their constitutional rights.88 The
Court found their vague, speculative inhibitions insufficient
to grant standing. 89 The Court hypothesized that an actual
controversy might exist for the three plaintiff-intervenors
had they alleged a threat of prosecution, the likelihood of
prosecution, or a remote possibility of prosecution,90 but
mere speculatidn of prosecution is insufficient to provide a
basis for suit. 91 Thus, only Harris had standing to bring
suit. 92
The Court's core holding is that, absent special circumstances, a criminal defendant may not enjoin a pending,
ongoing, state prosecution by filing an action in federal
quirement that the exercise of judicial power is limited by the Constitution to
"cases" and "controversies."
87. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41·42.
88. See id. at 42. Intervenors Dan and Hirsch alleged they felt inhibited to
advocate the replacement of capitalism with socialism while Intervenor
Broslawsky felt uncertain whether he could, as part of his class studies, teach
Karl Marx's doctrines or read from the Communist Manifesto. See id. at 39-40.
89. Emanating from the case or controversy requirement is the requirement
that the federal plaintiff must have "standing" to bring the lawsuit. The federal
. plaintiff must show both a palpable injury and a traceable connection between
the injury and the conduct of the offender. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-64 (1992); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125
(1991); International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1991).
90. If the three plaintiff-intervenors alleged a threat of prosecution, the Court
probably would not have abstained from deciding their claims. Federal injunctive relief would be proper for these three plaintiff-intervenors because they,
unlike Harris, were not parties to any ongoing state criminal proceedings.
91. Here Younger cited Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), where the
Court found the plaintiff's controversy to be purely conjectural in nature and
without a basis in reality. The dispute was previously argued in Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), where the Court ruled that the lower court erred
in abstaining from deciding the federal plaintiff's constitutional claim regarding
the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. See id. at 254. In Golden,
the federal plaintiff, was a former candidate for the House of Representatives
who had since been appointed to the New York State Supreme Court and,
according to the Court, would not, in all likelihood, ever again be a candidate
for the House of Representatives and would probably never again face the
threat to his constitutional rights. See Golden, 394 U.S. at 109.
92. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971).
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court. The key to the Court's decision was the fact that the
federal plaintiff, Harris, was then a subject of a pending
state prosecution. 93 Harris was indicted in a California
state court prior to filing his federal complaint.94 Because
Harris would have the opportunity to raise his constitutional
defenses in the state court proceeding,95 the Court held he
was not in danger of suffering irreparable injury.96 To enjoin the pending State prosecution would be to crack the
doctrinal foundation described by the Court as "Our Federalism. »97 Abstention was necessary to preserve the separate
functions of the state and federal governments.
The Younger Court specifically refused to express any
"view about the circumstances under which federal courts
may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts
at the time the federal proceeding is begun. »98 In a separate
concurring opinion,99 Justice Stewart emphasized that Younger dealt "only with the proper policy to be followed by a
federal court when asked to intervene. .. in a criminal
prosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state
COurt."lOO Justice Stewart further noted that the Younger
decision did not "resolve the problems involved when a fed93. See icl. at 39-40.
94. See id.
95. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-50. The Court distinguished Harris' opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding from the federal
plaintiff in Dombrowski, where the federal plaintiff was not assured that raising the constitutional claims in the state proceedings would result in the vindication of the violated constitutional rights because the threatened prosecution
was employed to harass the defendants. 380 U.S. at 479.
96. The Court stated that even irreparable injury is "insufficient unless it is
'both great and immediate. m Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v.
Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926). In his concurring opinion which Justice
Harlan joined, Justice Stewart defined a threat that is great and immediate to
include "official lawlessness" of the sort that amounts to bad faith prosecution
or official harassment. Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
97. For an analysis of whether the federalist defense of judicial review can
be sustained under modern scrutiny, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from the Federalist Papers, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 1669 (1988).
98. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added).
99. The concurring opinion also applies to Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Fernandez v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
100. Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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eral court is asked to give injunctive ... relief from future
state criminal prosecutions,,,lOl because Younger clearly
confined "itself to deciding the policy considerations that ...
must prevail when federal courts are asked to interfere with
pending state prosecutions. ,,102
The import of the pending state proceeding was further
emphasized by the Court's later decision in Steffel v.
Thompson. 103 In Steffel, the Supreme Court answered the
question specifically reserved in Samuels: 104 "whether
declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has
been threatened, but is not pending, and a showing of bad
faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not
been made.,,105 The Supreme Court was advised at oral argument that a state court proceeding was concurrently addressing the same issues presented in the federal court. 106
Nevertheless, the Court refused to abstain.
The litigant in Steffel w~s not involved in any pending
state court proceedings but had been threatened with arrest
under a state criminal statute. 107 Steffel filed suit in the
district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief restraining the respondents from enforcing a state statute in
violation of his protected constitutional rights, but the district court denied all requested relief finding the suit lacking
in "'the rudiments of an active controversy between the parties. ",108 Plaintiff Steffel appealed the denial of declaratory
relief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 109
101. [d. at 55 (emphasis in the original).
102. [d. at 56.
103. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
104. 401 U.S. at 66; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974).
105. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 454. In Steffel, Guy Steffel and a companion were
handbilling against American involvement in Vietnam at the North Dekalb
Shopping Center. Police officers told them to stop handbilling or face arrest.
While Mr. Steffel ceased handbilling when he left the shopping center, his
companion stayed on the premises, continued handbilling, and was arrested. See
id. at 455-56.
106. Steffel's companion pursued a claim for relief in the state court system,
while Steffel, who was not arrested, pursued a claim for relief through the
federal court system. See id. at 456.
107. The threatened charge was criminal trespass in violation of Ga. Code
Ann. § 26-1503 (1972). See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 456.
108. [d.
109. Steffel abandoned his appeal from denial of injunctive relief in his appel-
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The Fifth Circuit recognized that Younger and Samuels
were expressly limited to circumstances where state prosecutions were pending when the federal action was initiated,
but the court refused to grant relief based on the opinion
that the irreparable injury standard also applied to requests
"'for injunctive relief against threatened state court criminal
prosecution' as well as against a pending prosecution. ,,110
Steffel then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, and reaffirming the need for sensitivity toward the notions enumerated in Younger, Justice
Brennan observed that "[n]either Younger nor Samuels,
however, decided the question whether federal intervention
might be permissible in the absence of a pending state prosecution."lll The Steffel decision answered this question by
holding:
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the
time the federal complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings
or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor
can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles. 112

late brief. He appealed only the denial of declaratory relief. See Steffel, 415
U.S. at 456 n.6.
110. [d. at 457.
111. [d. at 461.
112. [d. at 462. "Appellants in these two cases were all indicted in a New
York State Court on charges of criminal anarchy." Samuels, 401 U.S. at 67.
Steffel pointed out that in the absence of a pending state action, the Abstention
Doctrine is not applicable:
While a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a
concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on
the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is
pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. In Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38
(D. Conn. 1987), the court refused to abstain in a case involving a federal
plaintiff who was not a party to the underlying state action and who filed a
federal challenge to the enforcement of a state court order. Since there was no
pending prosecution against the federal plaintiff, and thus no adequate remedy
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The Court observed that in Roe v. Wade,ll3 while the
prosecution of Dr. Halliford for violating a Texas abortion
law was pending, the federal court was not prevented from
granting Plaintiff Roe, against whom no action was pending,
a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. 114 Justice Brennan stated: "[T]he relevant principles of
equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.'"115 The focus is on
pending state action against the federal plaintiff rather than
pending state action against some other third party. Although similar questions may be litigated in the state claim,
"Abstention would be improper in a case merely because the
same federal law questions presented are also being litigated
in another case. "116
In Wooley v. Maynard,l17 the federal plaintiff was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating the
state law which required the display of a particular license
plate on all automobiles registered within the state. After
serving his sentence, the state court defendant filed a claim
in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state
statute on the basis that the statute was in violation of the
First Amendment. In addressing the principles of equitable
restraint enunciated in Younger, the Supreme Court noted
that the federal plaintiff was not attempting to annul the
results of a state trial, but rather was trying to obtain prospective relief to preclude future prosecution under the statute. Under those circumstances, the federal plaintiff could
not "be denied consideration of a federal remedy."118
The two pillars of Younger include (1) a pending state
proceeding (2) against the same party bringing the federal
action. The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply

available to the federal plaintiff, the court refused to abstain.
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471 n.19.
115. [d. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509
(1972» (emphasis added).
116. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E. D. lll. 1978).
117. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
118. [d. at 71.
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when there is no pending state proceeding against the federal plaintiff at the time the federal complaint is filed.
2. The Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger dealt only
with federal court intervention in pending, ongoing state
criminal prosecutions. However, since the Court's 1971
opinion, the Younger Abstention Doctrine has been expanded
to apply to more than just state criminal proceedings.
a. Declaratory Relief
Applying the Younger Abstention Doctrine, the Samuels
Court declined federal intervention in an ongoing state proceeding despite the fact that the plaintiff requested both
injunctive and declaratory relief. 119 In Samuels the Supreme Court found very little difference between injunctive
and declaratory relief since
[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act provides that after a
declaratory judgment is issued the district court may
enforce it by granting "[flurther necessary or proper
relief," and therefore a declaratory judgment issued
while state proceedings are pending might serve as
the basis for a subsequent injunction against those
proceedings to "protect or effectuate" the declaratory
judgment, and thus result in a clearly improper interference with the state proceedings. 12o
The Supreme Court therefore held that
in cases where the state criminal prosecution was
begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable
principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction
must be taken into consideration by federal district
courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory
judgment, in that wherein an injunction would be

119. See id. at 72.
120. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well. 121
The Court also made clear its decision did not suggest
that a declaratory judgment should never be issued in cases
where injunctive relief would be considered improper. l22
The Court pointed out that
there may be unusual circumstances [where even
though] an injunction might be withheld, . . . a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and might
not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines gov. erning the availability of relief. l23
The same day in which Younger was decided, the Court
handed down Samuels v. Mackell,124 that expanded
Younger's proscription against federal injunctive relief involving a pending state criminal proceeding to also apply to
declaratory relief.
b. Quasi-Criminal Proceedings

Huffman involved an Ohio public nuisance statute
which provided, inter alia, that a place exhibiting obscene
films was considered a nuisance. 125 Any establishment violating the statute was subject to closure for up to one year
and any items considered obscene were subject to a forced
sale. l26 In Huffman, a state trial court ruled in favor of the
city in an action brought against a theater owner. Instead of
appealing the state decision, the theater owner filed suit in
the federal district court, alleging that the city's use of the
statute deprived the owner of certain constitutional rights.
The owner sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. 127

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

[d. at 73.
[d.
[d.
See 401 U.S. at 66.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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The district court found the nuisance statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment and enjoined execution of
the state court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted that
the federalism principle enunciated in Younger applied with
equal force to civil proceedings that essentially were quasicriminal in nature. l28 The Court found critical similarities
between a criminal prosecution and the Ohio nuisance proceedings. l29 The Court found that the Younger Abstention
Doctrine should apply in part because the theater owner
could have reached the same Supreme Court by proceeding
through the state appellant process. Instead, the theater
sought to use the federal court as a type of an appellate
court over the state court proceeding. l30 The next expansion occurred in 1975 with Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. ,t31
where the Court expanded Younger to encompass quasicriminal cases. 132
c. Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
In another case which arose out of the state of Ohio, a
religious school brought a civil rights action against the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission, seeking to enjoin the Commission
from exercising jurisdiction over a sex discrimination complaint brought by a discharged teacher.l33 After a pregnant
teacher was told that her employment contract would not be
renewed because of the school's religious doctrine that mothers should stay at home with their pre-school children, she
contacted an attorney who threatened suit. l34 The school

128. ld. at 604.
129. ld.
130. ld. at 605-06.
131. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
132. The Court based its decision in part on the finding that the civil enforcement was "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Huffman, 420
U.S. at 604. In his dissent, Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and
Marshall joined, vigorously contested the above quoted language as "the first
step toward extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding" in Younger, an extension with which he disagreed. ld. at 613-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619
(1986).
134. See id.
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then rescinded its decision not to renew the teacher, but
terminated her anyway because of her violation of their
internal dispute resolution doctrine. The teacher then filed a
complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The Commission initiated administrative proceedings against the
schooL 135 During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, the religious school filed suit in federal district
court seeking an injunction against the administrative process. The district court refused to enter an injunction, but
the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. l36 The Supreme Court ruled that the federal courts
should have abstained from adjudicating the case under the
Younger Abstention Doctrine. 137 The Court therefore held
that the Younger Abstention Doctrine was applicable to
quasi-judicial proceedings. l36 Following Huffman, the Court
inexorably expanded Younger to include not only quasi-crim- .
inal cases,139 but quasi-judicial cases. l40

135. See id.
136. See id. at 619·20.
137. Id. at 620. Citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576·77 (1933), the
Court noted that administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a
license to practice medicine may in certain circumstances command a respect
equal to typical court proceedings. The Court also pointed out that abstention
may apply to preclude a federal court from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by state ethics committees. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S.
at 628 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457
U.S. 423 (1982» (administrative proceedings involving Bar disciplinary actions
are "judicial in nature").
138. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 628.
139. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying the principles of
Younger abstention to appeals of contempt of court in judgment creditor action);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (applying Younger to attachment
proceedings); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (applying Younger to a Texas
child welfare agency involving the loss of custody of a child based on allegations of child abuse).
140. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423 (1982); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
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d. Civil Proceedings
In Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 141 a judgment debtor
filed suit in federal district court challenging a Texas state
court judgment in excess of eleven billion dollars and further
challenged the constitutionality of the Texas judgment lien
and appeal bond provisions which required that a bond be
posted in excess of thirteen billion dollars. Under Texas law
a judgment creditor can execute a lien on a judgment
debtor's property unless the debtor files a Supersedeas Bond
in at least the amount of the judgment plus interest and
cost.142 After the jury's verdict, but before the trial court
entered judgment, it was clear that Texaco would not be
able to post a bond in the amount of thirteen billion dollars.
Since Texaco would not be able to post such a high bond,
Penzoil would have been able to commence enforcement of
the judgment on the verdict even before Texaco's appeal had
been resolved. l43 Therefore, Texaco filed suit in federal district court claiming that the proceedings violated rights secured by the Constitution and various federal statutes. Texaco asked the district court to enjoin Penzoil from taking any
enforcement action. The district court ruled in favor of Texaco and issued a preliminary injunction. l44 Applying the
Younger Abstention Doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled that
the court should have abstained under the principles of federalism. 145 More particularly, the Court pointed to the fact
that the Texas courts never had the opportunity to construe
the statute and thus federal intervention would have deprived the Texas courts of "an opportunity to adjudicate its
constitutional claims. "146 In making this statement the
Supreme Court clearly had in mind the principles annunciated in the Pullman Abstention Doctrine. Though the Supreme Court did not focus on the fact that this case involved

id.
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
146. [d. at 17.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See
See

6.
6.
8.
10.
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purely a civil matter, it is clear that the Court extended the
Abstention Doctrine to civil proceedings. The Supreme Court
eventually expanded the Younger Abstention Doctrine to
civil proceedings. 147
IV. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The so-called Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine originated in the case of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 148 and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 149 The
concept underlying the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine
is that Congress has conferred only original jurisdiction, not
appellate jurisdiction, on the federal district courts. The
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine exists to prevent a party in a state
court from having two bites at the apple: one through the
state courts up through the United States Supreme Court,
and a subsequent collateral attack through the federal
courts. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine prohibits a
party who litigates a case up through the state court system,
and not content with the ruling handed down by the state
court, ceases litigation and then begins the same litigation
in the federal court system. In other words, rather than
choosing to request the United States Supreme Court by
writ of certiori to review the case, the party ceases litigation
and begins litigating the identical issue in the federal district court. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine essentially holds that the federal district court does not have
appellate jurisdiction over the state court. The avenue for
the state court party is to continue through the state court
proceeding up to the United States Supreme Court if possible. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable
in cases where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the
state court proceeding. "The Rooker-Feldman Abstention
Doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court brought
by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in
state court."150 In Valenti v. Mitchell/ 51 the Third Circuit
147. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (where neither party was
the state).
148. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
149. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
150. United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth
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stated it could find "no authority which would extend the
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine to persons not parties
to the proceedings before the State Supreme Court ...."152
The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does not apply
where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state litigation. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Martin v.
Wilks,153 has clearly established that a federal plaintiff is
not required to intervene in a state court proceeding in order
to protect threatened constitutional rights:
Petitioners argue that, because respondents failed to
timely intervene in the initial proceedings, their current challenge to actions taken under the consent
decree constitutes an impermissible "collateral attack" .... The position has sufficient appeal to have
commanded the approval of the great majority of the
Federal Courts of Appeals, but we agree with the contrary view. . . The law does not impose upon any
person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of

Circuit in Owens observed the following:
Neither the Postal Service nor any other federal defendant was a
party to the action in the Ohio courts . . . Clearly, a party cannot be
said to be appealing a decision by a state court when it was not a
party to the case. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to bar
a suit in federal court brought by a party that was not a party in a
preceding action in state court. . . . A party has no obligation to attempt to intervene in a state court action when it is not named in
the suit in order to preserve its rights. Because the Postal Service
was not a party in a state court action in this case, the RookerFeldman Doctrine does not apply and the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction.
Owens, 54 F.3d at 274.
151. 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992).
152. [d. at 297-98. In Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598, the federal party was also
party to a state court action prior to the time the federal suit was initiated.
The federal plaintiff sought federal court review of a state court ruling. Following the entry of judgment by the state court, the state court defendant filed
suit in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin prosecution. "Rather than appealing [the state court] judgment within the Ohio
court system, [the state court defendants] immediately filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio." Huffman, 420 U.S. at
598. Here Rooker·Feldman abstention was appropriate because the state court
parties sought to use the federal courts as an appellate court.
153. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does
not require "that persons claiming a violation of their federal
rights have an obligation before turning to [a] federal court
to see whether there is some state court proceeding that
they might join in order to present their federal claims
there."I55 "A nonparty is not precluded from relitigating
matters decided in a prior action simply because it passed by
an opportunity to intervene."156 Moreover, the Supreme
Court stated, in Steffel v. Thompson, that a federal plaintiff
is not required "first to seek vindication of his federal rights
in a state declaratory judgment action. ,,157 A federal plaintiff is "not required to utilize state judicial remedies before,
or instead of, bringing a Section 1983 action in federal
court. ,,158

154. [d. at 762-63 (citations omitted). In Huffman, the Court addressed the
issue of exhausting state remedies. At the time the state court party filed suit
in federal district court, "it had available the remedy of appeal to the Ohio
Appellate Court." 420 U.S. at 610. Huffman clarified its opinion by stating the
following:
By requiring [an] exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the purposes of applying Younger[,] we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). There we held that one seeking redress under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate
state proceedings based on related state causes of action. [d. at 183.
Monroe v. Pape had nothing to do with the problem presently before
us, that of the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have
already been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the
resolution of federal issues. Our exhaustion requirement is likewise not
inconsistent with such cases as City Bank Farmers' Trust Company v.
Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934) and Bacon v. Rutland R. Company, 232
U.S. 134 (1914), which expressed the doctrine that a federal equity
plaintiff challenging state administrative action need not have exhausted his state judicial remedies. Those cases did not deal with
situations in which the state judicial process had been initiated.
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609 n.21 (emphasis added).
155. Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3rd Cir. 1992). See also Bickham v.
Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1980).
157. 415 U.S. at 475.
158. Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wisconsin, 979 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir.
1992) (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982». In Guarino
v. Larson, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit noted the following:
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THE BRILLHART ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine originated in the case
of Brillhart v. Excess Insurance CO. 159 To properly apply
Brillhart it is essential to understand that the facts of the
case dealt with (1) a pending parallel state suit, and (2) the
Declaratory Judgment Act.1°O Anticipating a coercive suit,
an insurance company sought declaratory relief in federal
court of nonliability on an insurance policy. The issues presented in the federal court involved only state claims which
were parallel to the state issues in the pending state proceeding. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of the suit, agreeing that although the district
court had jurisdication to hear the suit, "it was under no
compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction. "161 The Supreme
Court also agreed that when federal courts are presented
with a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act and there is
a pending parallel state proceeding, the question is whether
the controversy "can better be settled in the proceeding
pending in the state court."162

Our holding only applies where a litigant has been summoned to
participate in a state court proceeding or has voluntarily chosen a
state forum for some of his or her claims. In such cases, a litigant
must present all of his or her claims arising from the same transaction in order to avoid waiving those claims he or she does not raise.
We are not asserting that a litigant who has an opportunity to choose
between a state or federal forum to raise his or her initial claim must
choose a state forum in order to avoid waiver.
1d. at 1161 n.7.
159. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1997). The Act provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration." 1d.
161. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494.
162. 1d. at 495. Although Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors
governing a federal court's exercise of this discretion, it did provide some useful
guidance. For example, the district court should examine "the scope of the
pending state court proceeding and the nature of the defenses open there." 1d.
This inquiry requires the court to consider "whether the claims of all parties in
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary
parties have been joined, whether such parties are amenable to process in that
proceeding, etc." 1d. "[A]t least where another suit involving the same parties
and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pend-
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Some time after Brillhart was decided, the Supreme
Court handed down Colorado River Water Conservaton District v. United States l63 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.l64 Under the Colorado
River Abstention Doctrine a federal court may abstain only
under "exceptional circumstances. ,,165 A split of opinion
arose among the circuit courts wherein some held that a
federal court may stay a declaratory judgment action in
favor of a pending parallel state proceeding under only exceptional circumstances,l66 whereas other circuit courts
held that the more discretionary Brillhart standard applies
to declaratory actions when there is a parallel state proceeding. 167 The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Wilton
v. Seven Falls CO. I68 The Court noted that Brillhart had
not been overruled by Colorado River or Moses H. Cone in
that neither case dealt with the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 169 "Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act
has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and
sustantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
rights of litigants. "170 The Wilton Court noted that the De-

ing in state court, a district court might be indulging in '[glratuitous interfer·
ence: if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed." Wilton, 515 U.S.
at 283 (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495).
163. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
164. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
165. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
166. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d
1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that, pursuant to Colorado River and
Moses H. Cone, a district court may not stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment
action absent "exceptional circumstances"); Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co. v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust, 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986).
167. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774,
778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the "exceptional circumstances" test of
Colorado River and Moses H. Cone is inapplicable in declaratory judgment
actions); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992).
168. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
169. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 285.
170. [d. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv.
543 (1985); E. Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declaratory Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REv. 677 (1942); Edwin Borchard, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS 312-14 (2d ed. 1941).
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claratory Judgment Act creates "an opportunity, rather than
a duty," to grant relief to qualifying litigants. 171
The rule then under the Brillhart Absention Doctrine is
that when a federal court is faced with a suit involving the
resolution of state issues brought under the Declaratory
Judgment Act by parties who are also parties in a pending
parallel state proceding, the court has substantial discretion
to stay the proceedings in favor of the pending state suit.172
In such a case the Colorado River and Moses H. Cone "exceptional circumstances" test is inapplicable. 173
VI. THE COLORADO RNER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine originated in
the case of Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States. 174 Considerations underlying the Colorado
River Abstention Doctrine include conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation. 175
Under the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine, a federal
court may abstain from hearing a claim when there is a
pending state proceeding only under "exceptional circum-

171. 515 U.S. at 288.
172. See id. at 289-90.
173. [d.
174. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The facts in Colorado River involved the management and allocation of water. Colorado enacted legislation under which the
state was divided into seven Water Divisions, each with a procedure designed
to resolve disputes regarding water claims. Seeking to acljudicate reserved
rights claimed on behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes, as well as rights
based on state law in one of the Water Divisions, the United States, which had
previously asserted non-Indian reserved water rights in three other State Water
Divisions, brought suit in federal district court. One of the federal defendants
sought in state court to make the Government a party to proceedings in one of
the Water Divisions for the purposes of adjudicating all of the Government's
claims, both state and federal, pursuant to The McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C. § 666 (1997). This law requires consent to join the United States in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of water rights, or (2) the administration of such
rights, where it appears that the United States owns or is acquiring such
rights by appropriation under state law or otherwise. The district court dismissed the action based on abstention. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court found that abstention was not proper under any existing theory
but the court nevertheless granted dismissal.
175. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
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stances."176 The Colorado River Court found exceptional
circumstances under the facts of the case.
[T]he Court deemed dispositive a clear federal policy
against piecemeal adjudication of water rights; the
existence of an elaborate state scheme for resolution
of such claims; the absence of any proceedings in the
District Court, other than the filing of the complaint,
prior to the motion to dismiss; the extensive nature of
the suit; the 300-mile distance between the District
Court and the situs of the water district at issue, and
the prior participation of the Federal Government in
related state proceedings. 177
The Court noted that as between state and federal
courts, the rule is that the "pendency of an action in the
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same

176. 424 u.s. at 813-14.
177. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 284.
The Supreme Court in Madsen found that as applied to the state court
defendants the iJijunction was a content-neutral restriction. This was based
upon the fact that the injunction took into consideration past actions and attempted to restrain those activities. However, the same state court iJijunction
would probably operate as a content-based restriction when applied against
nonparties who had no past history of illegal behavior. See Machesky v. Bizell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting a federal injunction against a state
court iJijunction which the federal court found to be unconstitutionally
overbroad because it lumped protected speech with unprotected speech in such
a way as to abridge important public interests). "Machesky holds that where an
injunction is attacked on First Amendment grounds and is facially overbroad,
abstention for comity and federalism reasons is inappropriate." McKusick, 96
F.3d at 49 fn. 6. The McKusick court incorrectly assumed that since the
Madsen injunction was found to be content-neutral as applied to parties, it was
also content-neutral as applied to nonparties. McKusick, 96 F.3d at 488-489.
The Supreme Court in Madsen addressed only parties, and specifically indicated
that the parties were prohibited from challenging the "in concert" section since
this did not apply to them. Thus Madsen addressed only the application of the
injunction to the state defendants, Madsen 114 S.C. at 2530, whereas Cheffer
addressed only the "in concert" provision. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708-711. It is clear
that a state court injunction taking into consideration past illegal behavior may
operate as a content-neutral restriction on such activities, but the same injunction operating like a statute and applied against nonparties without past illegal
behavior is a content-based restriction. Thus, McKusick misreads the reach of
the Madsen case.
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matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction."178 As between federal district courts, there is no similar rule, but
"the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.,,179
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal, the federal
court may consider factors such as the inconvenience of the
federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the
concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determinative, and only "the clearest of justifications will warrant
dismissal. ,,180 When considering these various factors, the
Supreme Court in Colorado River noted the following:
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is
the exception, not the rule. The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to
exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is
an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of
a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly
before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases
can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to
repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. [I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise
judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a
State court could entertain it. lSI
The key to the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is to
determine whether there is a parallel state proceeding that
can provide complete relief. 182 The parallel factor and the
availability of complete relief are, "for all practical purposes,
identical. "183 "A suit is 'parallel' when substantially the
same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially

178. [d. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910».
179. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
180. [d. at 818-19.
181. [d. at 813-14 (citations and quotations omitted).
182. See Baskin v. Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569, 571
(6th Cir. 1994) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983».
183. Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 1990).
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the same issues in another forum, thus making it likely that
judgment in one suit will have a res judicata effect on the
other suit. ,,184
Colorado River abstention is inappropriate in this
case because the defendants fail to satisfy the threshold requirement that there be a concurrent state
court proceeding ... [W]e feel compelled to accept the
plaintiffs allegation that the state court proceeding is
over and done with. Accordingly, we must conclude
that there is no pending state proceeding and the
Colorado River abstention does not apply . . . .185
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine clearly does not
apply if substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issue in a federal court have ceased their litigation in the state courtS. I86 If the federal plaintiff is not a
party to the state court proceeding, then Colorado River
likewise does not apply. 187
VII. APPLYING THE PULLMAN, YOUNGER, ROOKER-FEWMAN,
BRILLHART, AND COLORADO RNER ABSTENTION DOCTRINES

The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when
the state law is clear and unambiguous, the state courts
have interpreted state law, or even when the state courts
have had the opportunity to interpret the state law but have
failed or refused to do so. Notwithstanding the United States
Supreme Court's expansion of Younger, the Younger Absten-

184. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229
n.1 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Burnstein v. Hosiery Mfg. Corp. of Morgantown,
Inc., 850 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. N.Y. 1994); Strasen v. Strasen, 897 F. Supp. 1179,
ll86 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
185. Strasen, 897 F. Supp. at ll86 (citations omitted).
186. See Leaf, 979 F.2d at 589. Abstention is improper where there is no
pending proceeding in a state court. See Aekenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689
(1992).
187. In the context of abstention generally, see United States v. Owens, 54
F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995); Hoover, 47 F.3d at 849; Bickham v. Lashof, 620
F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989);
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 472 ("requiring the federal courts totally to step aside when
no state [litigation] is pending against the federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its head").
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tion Doctrine does not apply when there is no pending state
proceeding against the federal plaintiff at the time the federal complaint is filed. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does not apply if the federal plaintiff is not using the
federal court system as a type of appellate panel to review
the state court ruling. Rooker-Feldman is only concerned
with a federal plaintiff who begins in the state court system
and fails to exhaust the state court appellate process. For
example, Rooker-Feldman would apply to prohibit federal
court intervention in a case where a state court plaintiff
proceeds with litigation through the state court system, and
then not content with the decision, begins litigating the
same issue again in the federal district court. The Brillhart
Abstention Doctrine applies only to circumstances involving
a federal suit addressing state issues under the Declaratory
Judgment Act with parties who are also parties to a pending
parallel state proceeding. The Colorado River Abstention
Doctrine is inapplicable when substantially the same parties
are not litigating substantially the same issues in a state
forum. Colorado River is inapplicable if the state proceedings have terminated or if the federal plaintiff was not a
party to the state action.
In order to illustrate the application of these doctrines,
focus will now tum toward the case of Cheffer v.
McGregor. l88 In Cheffer, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals allowed federal intervention to block enforcement of a
state court injunction that established "buffer zones" around
a Florida abortion clinic. 1s9 The state court injunction,
styled Women's Health Care Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue/90 involved a conflict that arose when abortion opponents began picketing the Aware Woman's Center for
Choice, an abortion clinic located in a residential neighbor-

188. 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 41
F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
189. Although the holding in Chef{'er was vacated, the Eleventh Circuit did so
to allow the district court to consider what impact, if any, the United States
Supreme Court decision of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S.
753 (1994), had on the holding.
190. 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), rev. in part, aff. in part sub nom, Madsen v.
Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753.
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hood in Melbourne, Florida. In September of 1992, the state
court judge entered a permanent injunction prohibiting certain named defendants from trespassing upon the private
property of the clinic and from physically blocking, impeding, or obstructing access to or egress from the abortion cliniC. 19l During February and March of 1993, a new campaign
was launched against the abortion clinic. The original
named defendants were not involved in this renewed picketing effort.192 However, in April, state court judge Robert B.
McGregor issued an amended permanent injunction directed
against the same previously named defendants and those
acting "in concert" with them. 193 This new injunction creat-

191. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 666.
192. See Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test, 14 ST.
LoUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 465, 466-69 (1995).
193. The injunction was directed against Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue
America, Operation Goliath, Ed Martin, Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall
Terry, Judy Madsen, Shirley Hobbs, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them or on their behalf, with notice in any manner or by any
means of the order. The injunction then enjoined the defendants from the following:
(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and property of the Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc . . . .
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting,
or in any other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, ingress into and egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic.
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or
private property within thirty-six (36) feet of the property line of the
Clinic . . . An exception to the 36-foot buffer zone is the area immediately adjacent to the Clinic on the east. . . . The [defendantsl ...
must remain at least five (5) feet from the Clinic's east line. Another
exception to the 36-foot buffer zone relates to the record title owners
of the property to the north and west of the Clinic. The prohibition
against entry into the 36 foot buffer zones does not apply to such
persons and their invitees. The other prohibitions contained herein do
apply, if such owners and their invitees are acting in concert with the
[defendantsl....
(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays
through Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods,
from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns,
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images
observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic.
(5) At all times on all days, in an area within three-hundred
(300) feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to
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ed a thirty-six-foot "buffer zone" surrounding the abortion
clinic encompassing a public right-of-way, public sidewalk
and street. The named defendants and those "acting in concert" with them were forbidden from entering this speechfree zone. The state court injunction also prohibited any prolife image that could be observed from within the clinic, and
required that the pro-life speaker first receive consent from
communicate by approaching or by inquiring of the [defendants]. In
the event of such invitation, the [defendants] may engage in communications consisting of conversation of a nonthreatening nature and by
the delivery of literature within the three-hundred (300) foot area but
in no event within the 36 foot buffer zone. Should any individual
decline such communication, otherwise known as "sidewalk counseling,"
that person shall have the absolute right to leave or walk away and
the [defendants] shall not accompany such person, encircle, surround,
harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who
choose not to communicate with them.
(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound
amplification equipment within three-hundred (300) feet of the residence of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or agents, or
blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner,
temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways of
the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or
agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other
manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or
driveways or the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff,
owners or agents. The [defendants] and those acting in concert with
them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting to
impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons
to any street that provides the sole access to the street on which
those residences are located.
(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing,
intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting persons entering or leaving, working at or using services at
the [Abortion] Clinic or trying to gain access to, or leave, any of the
homes of owners, staff or patients of the Clinic.
(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or physically abusing, assualting or threatening any present or former doctor,
health care professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer
who assits in providing services at the [Abortion] Clinic.
(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging, inciting, or securing other person to commit any of the prohibited acts listed herein.
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2521-22; Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So.
2d 664; 679-80 (1993). A map attached to the injunction indicated a buffer zone
included a public sidewalk in front of the clinic as well as a public street and
adjacent right-of-way. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 682; Staver, supra
note 192, at 486.
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any person associated with, or seeking services from, the
clinic before speaking or distributing literature to them
within a three-hundred-foot buffer zone around the clinic. A
three-hundred-foot buffer zone was also placed around any
residential area where any owner, employee, or volunteer
lived. 194
After the issuance of the amended permanent injunction, a number of pro-life individuals were arrested for entering the thirty-six foot buffer zone. Myrna Cheffer was not
among those arrested. However, she filed suit in federal
district court against the state court judge, seeking to enjoin
enforcement of the state court injunction because the vagueness and overbreadth of the injunction caused her to fear
prosecution under the injunction. Cheffer stated she did not
condone nor participate in trespassing or blockading activities. However, she feared prosecution for violating the order
through application of the "in concert" section by merely entering the thirty-six foot buffer zone. Cheffer stated that she
knew of others who were neither named in the injunction
nor acted in concert with any of the named defendants but
who had been prosecuted under the injunction after entering
the buffer zone expressing a pro-life message. Indeed, during
court proceedings the state court judge stated that the injunction was intended to apply against anyone with a "prolife" view. 195 Cheffer therefore brought suit in federal court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state
court injunction. l96
194. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 760.
195. Id. at 793-797 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Cheffer v. McGregor, 6
F.3d 705, 711 (1993); Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test,
14 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 465, 476 (1995). Courts lack "equitable power to
issue an injunction that binds the world at large." McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478, 484, n. 5 (11th Cir. 1996). See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co.
v. National Labor Relations Bd., 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1944) ("The courts . . . may
not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make punishable
the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not be
adjudged according to the law."); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832
(2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("[A court] cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large,
no matter how broadly it words its decree."). The Supreme Court has also held
that an injunction against independent non parties may violate "established
principles of equity, jurisdiction and procedure." Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 477 (1934).
196. Cheffer asked the federal court to enjoin enforcement of the "in concert"
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In Cheffer the defendant argued that the Abstention
Doctrine should bar Cheffer's federal suit. 197 First, the defendant argued that since Cheffer was represented by the
same attorney who represented the state court defendants,
Cheffer's interests would be adequately defended. Second,
Cheffer could intervene in the ongoing state proceedings.
Third, Cheffer could file an amicus brief. Finally, the defendant argued that imposing a federal injunction against a
state injunction could ultimately result in the state court
judge being found in contempt of a federal court order if the
state court continued to enforce the state ordered injunction.
According to the defendant, allowing such a clash between
the federal and state systems would cause a calamitous
result.
In the district court, Cheffer claimed that the injunction
acted as a prior restraint on her free speech rights, and that
the threat of prosecution chilled her ability to exercise her
rights. She sought both declaratory and injunctive relief
alleging a violation of her civil rights using 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 198 The district court denied motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, finding
that the balance of equities did not weigh in Cheffer's favor.
Cheffer appealed the district court decision to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that Cheffer had
standing to sue, that the Abstention Doctrine did not apply,

provision of the state court injunction from being applied against anyone who
merely espoused a pro-life viewpoint if they were not actively aiding and abetting the named state court defendants. Alternatively, Cheffer requested declaratory relief. Specifically, Cheffer asked the federal court declare that the "in
concert" provision could not be applied against any person with a pro-life view
without proof that the demonstrator knowingly aided and abetted the state
court defendants. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 705.
197. [d. at 709.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997).
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and that she met the necessary criteria for injunctive relief. 199
A The Application of Pullman
Pullman and its progeny dealt with a statute, regulation, or perhaps an ordinance but never an injunction. 2°O In
Madsen v. Women's Health Center,201 the Supreme Court

199. See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709-10.
200. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451 (1987) (concerning a state law controversy involving a city ordinance); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (discussing the state law issue
of the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (arising from the difficulty with the state's
public nuisance statute); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (discussing the
constitutionality of state fishing laws and regulations); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967) (challenging a New York penal statute).
201. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The petitioners in Madsen were some of the same
named defendants in the state court case known as Women's Health Center,
Inc. v. Operation Rescue discussed above. The injunction at issue in Madsen
was the same injunction at issue in Chelfer. The difference between the two
cases is that Madsen dealt with the named state court defendants while Cheffer
dealt with the application of the same injunction to non-parties through the "in
concert" provision. The Supreme Court in Madsen found that as applied to the
state court defendants the injunction was a content-neutral restriction. This was
based upon the fact that the injunction took into consideration past actions and
attempted to restrain thOS!! activities. However, the same state court injunction
would probably operate as a content-based restriction when applied against
nonparties who had no past history of illegal behavior. See Machesky v. Bizell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting a federal injunction against a state
court injunction which the federal court found to be unconstitutionally
overbroad because it lumped protected speech with unprotected speech in such
a way as to abridge important public interests). "Machesky holds that where an
injunction is attacked on First Amendment grounds and is facially overbroad,
abstention for comity and federalism reasons is inappropriate." McKusick, 96
F.3d at 49 n.6. The McKusick court incorrectly assumed that since the Madsen
injunction was found to be content-neutral as applied to parties, it was also
content-neutral as applied to nonparties. McKusick, 96 F.3d at 488-89. The
Supreme Court in Madsen addressed only parties, and specifically indicated
that the parties were prohibited from challenging the "in concert" section since
this did not apply to them. Thus Madsen addressed only the application of the
injunction to the state defendants, Madsen 512 U.S. at 776, whereas Cheffer
addressed only the "in concert" provision. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708-11. It is clear
that a state court injunction taking into consideration past illegal behavior may
operate as a content-neutral restriction on such activities, but the same injunction operating like a statute and applied against nonparties without past illegal
behavior is a content-based restriction. Thus, McKusick misreads the reach of
the Madsen case.
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discussed the differences between an injunction and an ordinance or statute. A judge "is charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a
statute addressed to the general public. "202 In discussing
the "obvious differences. .. between an injunction and a
generally applicable ordinance," the Court noted that an
ordinance reflects a legislative preference to promote a particular societal interest whereas an injunction is a remedy
"imposed for violations . .. of a legislative or judicial decree. "203 For purposes of applying Pullman, the differences
between an injunction and a statute are really irrelevant,
except any injunction has already been favored with a judicial decree while a statute may have never had its day in
court. In Pullman, the Court stated that the question of
state law rested with the Texas Supreme Court because the
interpretation of the statute was "far from c1ear."2D4 The
Court expressed concern that a later ruling by the state
court would result in an apparent contradiction requiring
the issue to be relitigated in the federal court forum. 205
Pullman may apply when the state law is subject to more
than one interpretation and the state courts have not had
the opportunity to interpret its meaning. However, an injunction, by its very nature, has already been crafted by a
state court. Pullman should rarely, if ever, apply to a state
court injunction. 206 In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,207 the

202. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. A state court injunction constitutes state action
even if both opposing parties are private actors. See, e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Gresham
Park Community v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1981); Henry v.
First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979).
203. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764.
204. 312 U.S. at 499.
205. See id. at 499-500.
206. In Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc., F.3d 1998 WL 177955.
(6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit, in a case substantially similar to the facts
raised in Cheffer, found that none of the Abstention Doctrines applied, but then
noted, under the principles of comity and federalism outlined in the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, federal courts should abstain from entering an injunction
against a state court until the state court had an opportunity to clarify the
reach of the injunction to nonparties. Id at 8. Though the Pullman Abstention
Doctrine applies in a case addressing an ambiguous statute which the courts
have not had the opportunity to address, Pullman generally should not apply
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Supreme Court clearly settled the issue of how a federal
court is to weigh the clarity of the state law embroiled in a
constitutional controversy before deciding whether Pullman
applies. In Constantineau, a law enforcement officer posted a
notice to all liquor stores forbidding the sale of alcohol to the
federal plaintiff for one year.208 The federal plaintiff was
not provided notice or the opportunity for a hearing. 209
Though urged to apply Pullman and avoid the constitutional
question, the Court instead found the practice of posting
notices unconstitutional. 21o Since the statute was clear and
unambiguous, Pullman did not apply.211 Pullman abstention is only appropriate when state law is unclear.212
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.213 The state argued
when a court injunction is at issue since the court has obviously had the
opportunity to address the matter. Moreover, a nonparty generally does not
have the opportunity to request modification or clarification to a state injunction. However, the court in Gottfried pointed to an unpublished Ohio case
which ru!ed that an original action in prohibition could be used to challenge an
injunction that restricts the free speech of a nonparty. Gottfried 1988 WL
177955 at 6.
207. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
208. See id. at 435.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 437. The Court found that the facts of the case demanded an
opportunity for due process. The statute lacked any provision for the victim of
the posting to be heard. See id. at 437-39.
211. See id. at 439.
212. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 438 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 534 (1965».
213. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Hawaii Hous. Auth. involved a factually complicated
constitutional challenge to the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which was designed to
redistribute the landownership of Hawaiians more evenly since the vast majority of the land in Hawaii was owned by a very few people. See id. at 231-35. In
Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc., 1998 WL 177955 (6th Cir. 1998),
the Sixth Circuit, in a case substantially similar to the facts raised in Cheifer,
found that none of the Abstention Doctrines applied, but then noted, under the
principles of comity and federalism outlined in the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, federal courts should abstain from entering an injunction against a state
court until the state court had an opportunity to clarify the reach of the
injunction to nonparties. Id. at *8. Though the Pullman Abstention Doctrine
applies in a case addressing an ambiguous statute which the courts have not
had the opportunity to address, Pullman generally should not apply when a
court injunction is at issue since the court has obviously had the opportunity to
address the matter. Moreover, a nonparty generally does not have the opportunity to request modification or clarification to a state injunction. However, the
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that the Court should apply Pullman and avoid reaching the
constitutional issues because the controversy involved state
law. 214 In rejecting this argument, the Court found
Pullman inapplicable because the state statute was clear
and unambiguous. 215 Pullman is appropriate when the
state law is unclear. 216 Pullman is not appropriate where
the state statute cannot be interpreted in such a way as to
avoid reaching the constitutional question. 217 Because abstention is the exception and not the rule, the Pullman Abstention Doctrine is limited to unclear issues of state
law. 218
In the Cheffer case, the issues of state law are not, and
cannot be, unclear. According to Pullman, the ostensible
basis for federal court abstention in reaching the merits of
the constitutional claim was to allow the Texas Supreme
Court the opportunity to resolve the uncertain area of law.
In Cheffer, the state court crafted the injunction Pullman
abstention is therefore inappropriate. 219
B. The Application of Younger
1. The Pending Prosecution

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
Younger Abstention Doctrine220 did not block Cheffer's suit.
"The Supreme Court has directed that Federal Courts
should not intervene in ongoing state proceedings 'when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not

court in Gottfried pointed to a recently decided Ohio case which ruled that an
original action in prohibition could be used to challenge an injunction that
restricts the free speech of a nonparty. [d. at *6.
214. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 236. The state also advanced a
Younger abstention argument. See id.
215. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 237.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 236. The Court, by inference, said that if the state statute is
"fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" the constitutional issue, then Pullman abstention is appropriate. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467
U.S. at 236 (quoting Harman, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965».
218. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 236.
219. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Cheffer did not address the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine.
220. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 37.
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suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."'221
"Younger abstention is only appropriate, however, when the
federal constitutional claims at issue can be raised by the
federal plaintiff in an on-going state court proceeding. "222
Noting that Cheffer had no remedy in state court "except to
subject herself to a criminal contempt citation," the court
reasoned that Younger abstention was inappropriate and
that the district court had jurisdiction to hear Cheffer's
claim. 223 The Eleventh Circuit was aware that similar issues presented in the federal court were pending in a contemporaneous state court proceeding before the Florida Supreme Court. 224 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not apply the Younger Abstention Doctrine, nor did it require that
Cheffer intervene in the state court action to have her constitutional claim adjudicated.
In order to correctly ascertain whether the principles of
Younger apply, the litigant must first recognize the crucial
distinguishing factor involving a pending state proceeding
against the federal plaintiff. The federal party in Younger
"was indicted in a California state court," prior to filing a
complaint requesting a federal court to enjoin the pending
state prosecution against him.225 Younger articulates the
"national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin
pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances."226 However, the Younger Court limited its holding
by stating: "We express no view about the circumstances
under which federal courts may act when there is no prose-

221. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971».
222. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709. See also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, (1986) (holding that Younger applies as long
as in the course of the state proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim).
223. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709.
224. The same amended permanent injunction was being challenged in both
state and federal court. The named defendants challenged the constitutionality
of the injunction in state court, while Cheffer, who was not a party to the
state court proceeding, challenged application of the injunction to non-parties
through the "in concert" provision.
225. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38-39 (1971).
226. [d. at 41 (emphasis added).
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cution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun. "227
The Younger Abstention Doctrine's foundation rests on a
sensitivity toward the principles of equity, comity, and federalism. 228 Younger reflects a respect for state functions, a
continuation of the federalist principle that the Federal
Government will function best if the states and their institutions are free to execute their separate functions, and an
acknowledgment of the fact that the nation is comprised of a
union of individual state governments. 229 Younger addressed these issues by refusing to allow a federal plaintiff,
who was a defendant in a pending state criminal prosecution, to obtain a federal court ruling in the midst of the
pending state action. 230 Separate concurring opinions of
Justices Stewart and Harlan further explained the parameters of the Younger holding. Noting several cases to which
the Younger decifJion would apply, Justices Stewart and
Harlan declared: "In all of these cases, the Court deals only
with the proper policy to be followed by a federal court when
asked to intervene by injunction or declaratory judgment in
a criminal prosecution which is contemporaneously pending
in a state court."231 As noted by the Court, "a proceeding
was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. "232 Hence,
the existence of the pending state prosecution was central to
the Younger decision.
Furthermore, Younger abstention cases discussing the
requirement of a pending state proceeding are manifold. In
the Younger companion case, Samuels v. Mackell,233 the
Court abstained because the federal plaintiffs were parties
to a proceeding in state court and had an opportunity to
raise their constitutional claims therein. As noted by the

227.
228.
229.
ger).
230.
231.
232.
233.

[d.
See id. at 43-44.
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975) (discussing YounSee Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54.
[d. at 55 (Stewart, J., Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
[d. at 49.
401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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Samuels Court, the federal plaintiffs "in these two cases
were all indicted in aNew York state court on charges of
criminal anarchy.,,234 As in Younger, the Samuels Court expressed "no views on the propriety of declaratory relief when
no state proceeding is pending at the time the federal suit is
begun.,,235 In both Younger and Samuels, abstention was
proper because the federal plaintiffs were also parties to
state court proceedings which were pending at the time the
federal suit was initiated.
For the same reason that Younger applies to the facts in
Juidice v. Vail/.3S Younger does not apply to the facts of
Cheffer. In Juidice, a state court party had been found in
contempt of court as a judgment debtor. 237 While still a
party in the state court, Vail attempted to bring a federal
action to enjoin enforcement of the statutory provisions authorizing the contempt judgment.238 Again, as in Younger
and Samuels, the federal plaintiff was a party to a state
court proceeding which allowed an adequate opportunity to
present a constitutional claim for relief. 239
The fact that the federal plaintiffs in the previously
discussed cases were also party defendants in a pending
state proceeding is precisely why the Younger Abstention
Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer. Unlike Harris in Younger, the federal plaintiff in Cheffer was not a party to any
pending proceeding in state court and had never been arrested under the state court injunction.
The federal plaintiff in Steffel v. Thompson 240 is almost
identical to the federal plaintiff in Cheffer. Like the litigant
in Cheffer, the federal plaintiff in Steffel was not involved in
any pending state court prosecution. 241 Rather, a companion of Steffel was involved in a pending state prosecu-

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

[d. at 67.
Samuels, 401 U.S. at 73-74.
430 U.S. 327 (1977).
See id. at 329.
See id. at 330.
See id. at 337.
415 U.S. 452 (1974).
See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 455-56.
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tion. 242 In contrast to the Younger litigants, Steffel had
been personally threatened with arrest under a Georgia
criminal trespass statute.243 Though Steffel "desired to return to the shopping center to distribute handbills, he [did
not do] so because of his concern that he, too, would be arrested for violation" of the Georgia Statute. 244
Similarly, in Cheffer, several pro-life protesters had been
named as defendants in a court ordered injunction bought by
several abortion clinics. This injunction applied to the
named defendants and those acting "in concert" with them.
Ms. Cheffer was not a named defendant. However, she wanted to distribute literature and discuss alternatives to abortion on a public sidewalk outside the abortion clinic within
the thirty-six foot buffer zone. The injunction prohibited the
named defendants and those acting in concert with them
from using the public sidewalk. 245 The injunction required
city officials to post a sign stating: "WARNING. Demonstrations and picketing in this area are limited by court order.
Violators of this court order are subject to arrest."246 The
local police enforced the injunction by arresting anyone espousing a pro-life message who dared enter the thirty-six
foot speech free zone. When these non-party arrestees were
brought before the state judge who issued the injunction, the
judge stated that his order applied to anyone with a pro-life
view.247 Ms. Cheffer became aware of how the "in concert"
section of the injunction was being applied. Though not
named in the injunction, she feared prosecution under the
injunction. 248 Accordingly, Ms. Cheffer is unlike the three

242. See id. at 454-59.
243. See id. at 456-59.
244. [d. at 456.
245. The state court judge loosely applied the "in concert" provision to any
person entering the thirty-six foot buffer zone who espoused a pro-life view
regardless of whether they were actively aiding and abetting the named defendants. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 783-820 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993);
Staver, supra note 192, at 476.
246. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d. at 680.
247. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Appendix to
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. See id. at 815-20.
248. See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708.
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federal intervenors in Younger whom the Court dismissed
for lack of a genuine controversy.249
The Younger Court characterized the allegations of the
threat of prosecution by the other three plaintiff.intervenors
as merely "imaginary or speculative."250 In contrast, the
Steffel Court held that Mr. Steffel's allegations of the threat
of prosecution could not be characterized as either speculative or imaginary.251 The Steffel Court went on to state
that "the prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion is
ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest
has not been 'chimerical.",252
In like manner, Cheffer's claims were neither speculative, nor imaginary. Because other unnamed pro-life protesters not associated with the named defendants had been
prosecuted under the "in concert" provision of the injunction,
Cheffer's fear of prosecution was legitimate and real. Approximately fifty other non·party pro·life protesters were
arrested for entering the so-called "buffer zone. "253 Conse-

249. See id. at 708-09.
250. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41.
251. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
252. [d. at 459 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961».
253. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 707. State and federal courts may issue an injunction
against a defendant and those acting "in concert" with the defendant. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 65(d). Rule 65(d) was patterned after the Clayton Act, which was
enacted to curtail abuses of federal strike injunctions. H.R. REP. No. 612
(1912). Judge Learned Hand once observed:
[A court] cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large no matter how
broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro
tanto brutum fulmen [sound and fury signifying nothing], and the
persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisidiction is limited to those
over whom it gets personal service, and who therefore have their day
in court. Thus, the only occasion when a person not a party may be
punished, is when he has helped to bring about, not merely what the
decree has forbidden, because it may have gone too far, but what it
has power to forbid, an act of a party. This means that the respondent must either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified
with him . . . This is far from being a formal distinction; it goes deep
into the powers of a court of equity... It is by ignoring such procedural limitations that the injunction of a court of equity may by slow
steps be made to realize the worst fears of those who are jealous of
its prerogative.
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis add-
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quently, unlike the three plaintiff-intervenors in Younger,
Ms. Cheffer had an "acute, live controversy" with the state

ed). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized certain limitations of
an injunction:
It is true that persons not technically agents or employees may be
specifically enjoined from knowingly aiding a defendant in performing
an act if their relation is that of associate or confederate. Since such
persons are legally identified with the defendant and privy to his contempt, the provision merely makes explicit as to them that which the
law already implies. But by extending the injunction to 'all persons to
whom notice of the injunction should come,' the District Court assumed to make punishable as a contempt the conduct of persons who
act idependently and whose rights have not been adjudged according
to law . . . To subject them to such peril violates established principles of equity jurisdiction and procedure.
Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, Ohio, 291 U.S. 431, 437 (1934). The
injunction at issue in Cheffer sought in essence to enjoin the entire world. The
state court judge ordered that a sign be posted around the abortion clinic stating: "WARNING. Demonstrations and picketing in this area are limited by
court order. Violators of this court order are subject to arrest." Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 680 (Fla. 1993). Unfortunately, some courts have not been careful when crafting and enforcing injunctions.
Courts should be cautious when applying injunctions to those acting "in concert." See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945) (stating
that a court "may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to
make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose
rights have not been adjudged according to law"); Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d
841, 843 (6th Cir. 1951) (stating that a non-party "may not be held guilty of
contempt for violating an injunction unless he is shown to be identified with or
is an aider or abetter of the party originally enjoined."); Kean v. Hurley, 179
F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 1950) (stating that "persons who are not parties to the
injunction or in privity with them . . . are not bound by the decree and cannot
be held liable for acts done contrary thereto even though the decree assumes to
bind them."); Petersen v. Fee Int'l Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938, 942 (W.D. Oklo 1975)
(discussing how Rule 65(d) follows the common law rule that non-parties are
bound by an injunction only if they are legally identified with a named party
or aided or abetted the named party in his violation of the decree); Wright V.
County Sch. Bd. of Greensville County, Va., 309 F. Supp. 671, 677 (E.D. Va
1970) rev'd 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971) (discussing how Rule 65(d) fixes the
scope of valid injunctions, and terms in a decree exceeding the rule are of no
effect; non-parties who act independently are not subject to sanctions); Baltz V.
Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 693 (N.D. TIL 1959) (stating that "Persons who are not
parties to the injunction or in privity with them . . . are not bound by the
decree in so far as it operates in personam and cannot be held for acts done
contrary to its terms"); Chilsolm V. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.S.C.
1954) (stating that an "injunction cannot issue to bind the public at large" even
though it purports to do so); Baltimore Transit CO. V. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382,
386 (D. Md. 1943) (stating that a court "cannot lawfully enjoin the world at
large").
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regarding her constitutionally protected rights. 254
A cursory examination of Hicks v. Miranda,255 might
compel one to assert that the Court's holding argues for
application of the Younger Abstention Doctrine to the facts
of Cheffer. In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the "principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force" when
"state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal
plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in
the federal court. ,,256 Because of a violation of the obscenity
standards, the federal plaintiff in Hicks faced possible criminal prosecution at the time the federal lawsuit was initiated.
However, although the federal plaintiffs employees were
charged, the state criminal proceedings against the plaintiff
had not yet begun. The state criminal proceedings were not
begun until after the federal plaintiff filed a complaint in
federal court. The fact that the Hicks federal plaintiff was a
party to an ongoing state proceeding, though the state criminal proceedings were not initiated until after the federal suit
was initiated, is a crucial fact that distinguishes Hicks from
the facts surrounding Cheffer. Again, Cheffer was not involved in any state proceedings, nor was prosecution against
her about to commence. Therefore, the Younger Abstention
Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer.
Since Cheffer was not involved in any pending state
proceeding, she had no opportunity to adjudicate her consti-

254. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); see Cheffer v. McGregor, 6
F.3d 705, 708-09 (11th Cir. 1993).
255. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). The Court said that the federal plaintiff "had a
substantial stake in the state proceedings. . . . .. [d. at 348. Such language
might seem to indicate that a federal plaintiff, not a party in the state proceeding, possessing a "substantial stake," could be barred from alljudicating her
constitutional claim in federal court under Younger analysis. However, Hicks
does not stand for the proposition that a federal plaintiff who has an interest
in the outcome of a pending state proceeding, although not a party, is barred
from bringing an action in federal court. To the contrary, the facts in Hicks
indicate that the federal plaintiffs's employees had already become enmeshed in
ongoing state proceedings. The Hicks federal plaintiff had already been a target
of state investigation and was on the verge of being charged by the state. The
mere fact that the Hicks federal plaintiff beat the state officials to the court
house was not enough to exempt him from the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
256. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349.
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tutional claims. In the absence of federal court intervention,
Ms. Cheffer would face the difficult choice of either intentionally flouting state law,257 or foregoing her constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming entangled
in a state proceeding. However, as noted in Steffel, "it is not
necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest
or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute which he
claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights. JJ258
The Supreme Court's opinion in Steffel is directly on point
and controls the outcome of whether the principle of Younger
applies to the facts of Cheffer. Clearly, abstention is not
appropriate when a party lacks the opportunity to vindicate

257. There is a significant difference between an unconstitutional statute or
ordinance and an injunction. According to the United States Supreme Court,
one may violate an unconstitutional statute or ordinance at will and later challenge its constitutionality. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969). Any fine or conviction levied for the violation will be null and void
ab initio once the law is ruled unconstitutional. However, if one is found in
contempt of violating an injunction that is later ruled unconstitutional, the contempt finding and punishment remain. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307 (1967). This is known as the collateral bar rule. Simply put, a party subject to a court order must obey it or face contempt. The court order must be
respected until it is later vacated or declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Walker,
388 U.S. at 307 (sustaining contempt conviction for violation of an ex parte
injunction and upholding the lower court's application of the collateral bar rule
even where the equities cut so dramatically in favor of the accused
contemnors); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947)
("an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper
proceedings"); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922) ("It is for the court of
first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its
decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or a higher
court, its orders based on its decisions are to be respected, and disobedience of
them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished"); In re Establishment
Inspection of Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Novak,
932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Disobedience of an invalid court order
may be punished as a criminal contempt"); In re Providence Journal Co., 820
F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g en bane, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st
Cir. 1987). The collateral bar rule is premised on the idea of preventing chaos
and respect for the rule of law. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21. The only exceptions to the collateral bar rule are lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Some courts have found another exception "where the injunction was
transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity." In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Walker, 388 U.S. at 315); see also
In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, 881 F.2d at 727.
258. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).
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their constitutional claims in a court proceeding. To apply
Younger to such a scenario offends the core of "Our Federalism." As reaffirmed in Steffel:
In the instant case, principles of federalism not only
do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it.
Requiring the federal courts totally to step aside
when no state criminal prosecution is pending
against a federal plaintiff would turn federalism on
its head. When federal claims are premised on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) - as they are
here - we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal
courts to protect constitutional rights. But exhaustion
of state remedies is precisely what would be required
if both federal injunctive and declaratory relief were
unavailable in a case where no state prosecution had
been commenced. 259
. Without the ability to pursue her claim in federal court,
Cheffer found herself "placed between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing
what [s]he . . . believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in [a] ... criminal
proceeding. ,,260
When confronted with such a situation, the Supreme
Court in Wooley v. Maynard said, "Younger does not bar
federal jurisdiction."261 In Wooley, the defendant was arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating a
state law which required the display of a particular license
plate on all automobiles registered within the state. After
serving his sentence, he filed a complaint in federal court
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state statute on the
basis that the statute was a violation of his First Amendment rights. In addressing the principles of equitable re-

259. [d. at 472·73 (internal quotes omitted).
260. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977) (quoting Steffel v. ThompBon, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974».
261. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711.
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straint enunciated in Younger, the Supreme Court noted
that the federal plaintiff was not attempting to annul the
results of a state trial, but rather was trying to obtain prospective relief to preclude future prosecution under the statute. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff could not "be
denied consideration of a federal remedy."262 Likewise,
Cheffer was not seeking to annul a state trial but she was
seeking prospective relief.
Some have argued that federal courts should abstain
even when there is no pending state court proceeding when
the federal plaintiff has not first attempted to intervene in
the pending state courts or brought a separate action in the
state system. This argument was raised and rejected outright in Hoover v. Wagner. 263 The facts in Hoover are very
similar to the facts in Cheffer. The Hoover case also involved
a state court injunction issued against certain named pro-life
protestors and those acting "in concert" with them.264 Like
Cheffer, the injunction in Hoover created a buffer zone
around abortion clinics. State officials, including the state
courts, enforced the injunction against anyone espousing a
pro-life view entering the buffer zone who spoke with or
even glanced toward a nearby defendant who was named in

262. Id.
263. 47 F.3d 845, 847 (7th eir. 1995). The facts in Hoover involved two pro·
life picketers and a journalist who brought suit in federal court challenging a
state court iI\iunction which restricted certain named defendants and those
acting in concert with them from picketing certain named abortion clinics. The
federal plaintiffs were not parties to the state court iI\iunction and had never
been named in any state court proceeding, but they claimed they were in fear
of arrest for picketing in and around the abortion clinics and for taking
photographs of the incidents. The state court injunction prohibited certain
named defendants "and all persons acting in concert with them and having
received notice of' the injunction from trespassing on or blocking access to
specified abortion clinics; from congregating, demonstrating, or otherwise protesting with twenty-five feet of the entrances to the clinics; from photographing
license plates of cars of those using the clinics; and from refusing to desist
from "sidewalk counseling" at the request of the person being counseled. The
plaintiffs further claimed that law enforcement officers and the state courts
judges had applied the injunction to anyone standing in the vicinity of a named
defendant without any additonal proof of active or knowing association with the
named defendants. Moreover, the journalist alleged he had been threatened
with arrest for taking photographs.
264. Hoover, 47 F.3d at 846-47.
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the state court injunction. 265 Fearing arrest, the federal
plaintiffs, who were not named in the state court injunction
and were not involved in any state court proceeding, brought
suit in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.266
Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals opined that "[t]he core of the Younger doctrine is
the proposition that a person who is being prosecuted by a
state for violating its laws is not allowed to derail the prosecution by bringing a suit in federal court to enjoin the prosecution on the ground that the state statute on which it is
based is unconstitutional."267 The Younger Abstention Doctrine only applies to pending state court proceedings or "litigation between the same parties . . . raising the same issues
[.r 66 In Hoover, the federal defendants argued that the

265. See ill. at 847.
266. Because the federal plaintiffs were not named in the state court injunction and had not yet been arrested for violating its terms under the "in concert" provision, the federal court defendants argued the case should be dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless found that plaintiffs did have standing:
All that a plaintiff need show to establish standing to sue is a reasonable probability - not a certainty - of suffering tangible harm unless
he obtains the relief that he is seeking in the suit . . . Arrest, prosecution, and conviction are tangible harms, and so is abandoning one's
constitutional right of free speech in order to avert those harms.
Therefore the question on which standing turns in this case is the
probability that unless the plaintiffs obtain a declaration or injunction
limiting the enforcement of the Wisconsin state court's injunction, they
will either forgo their right of free speech or be arrested, prosecuted,
and perhaps even convicted. We cannot reckon the probability of these
consequences as being low. The two abortion protestors in the trio of
plaintiffs have made clear that they want to go right up to the line
that separates legal from illegal protest. If that line is drawn in
vague and wavering fashion by the state court injunction, or if the
Milwaukee police and other law enforcement officers interpret the
injunction in a way that subjects to arrest people who stop just short
of the line, then either these plaintiffs will be arrested if they insist
on going right up to the line, or they will draw well back from the
line and as a result (since it is quite possible that the injunction goes
as far as it could without violating the First Amendment) forgo the
full exercise of their consitutional rights."
[d. at 847 (citations omitted).
267. [d. at 848.
268. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440 (1977) (emphasis added).
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federal court should abstain from hearing the case because
the plaintiffs could either file the same complaint in state
court or intervene in one of 'several state court proceedings. 269 "There is no duty to intervene to stave off the use
of a case as res judicata against one[self]. "270 "Certainly
nothing in Younger or the cases following it suggests that
persons claiming a violation of their federal rights have an
obligation before turning to federal court to see whether
there is some state court proceeding that they might join in
order to present their federal claims there."271 Younger
does not impose a duty on the federal plaintiff to intervene
in other suits pending in state court of which the federal
plaintiff is not a party.
Requiring a federal plaintiff to discover and then join
any factually similar pending state action would create timeliness constraints. In addition, if similarly situated plaintiffs
could be forced to join an ongoing state proceeding they
would be constrained by the allegations and pleadings of the
pending state proceeding. Plaintiffs such as Cheffer and
Hoover would be unfairly limited by the claims and defenses
raised by the original state parties. Such a heavy burden
would result in the denial of constitutionally protected freedoms and the inability to seek adequate redress. Requiring
potential federal plaintiffs to seek out and join any factually
similar state proceeding would certainly result in the denial
of constitutionally protected rights.
In Steffel, the United States Supreme Court was informed during Oral Argument that the identical issue was
pending in the state courtS. 272 The Steffel court pointed to
the facts in Roe v. Wade,273 noting that while the pending
prosecution of a' physician under Texas law was found to
render his action for declaratory and injunctive relief impermissible, this fact did not prevent the Supreme Court from
granting Roe, against whom no action was pending, a de-

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Hoover, 47 F.3d at 848.
[d. at 848. See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
[d.
See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 n.22 (1974).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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claratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. 274 Steffel did not require the federal plaintiff to seek out
and join the ongoing state proceeding. An action may be
brought in federal court so long as the plaintiff is not a party
to ongoing state proceedings.
2. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

The Supreme Court in Steffel noted the difference between injunctive and declaratory relief by observing that the
lower court erred in treating the requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief as a single issue. 275
[W]hen no state prosecution is pending and the only
question is whether declaratory relief is appropriate
[,] ... the congressional scheme that makes the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional
rights, and the expressed congressional authorization
of declaratory relief, afforded because it is a less
harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction, become the factors of primary significance. 276
In analyzing the standard for declaratory relief, the
Court noted that a pervasive sense of nationalism led to the
enactment of certain civil rights laws and further found that
the new exertion of federal power was no longer entrusted to
the enforcement of state agencies. 277 In order to create a
system which would permit federal courts to be the ultimate
arbiters of federal constitutional rights against governmental intrusion, Congress, in 1934, enacted the Declaratory
Judgment Act.278 The Steffel Court observed the following:
That Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to
act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the
injunction and to be utilized to test the constitution-

274. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471 n.19; Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-27, 166.
275. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463.
276. [d. at 463 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (separate
opinion of Brennan, J.) (brackets in the original».
277. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 464 n.13.
278. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-12 (1997); Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466.
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ality of state criminal statutes in cases where injunctive relief would be unavailable is amply evidenced by
the legislative history of the Act ....279
Clearly, the "Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to
provide an alternative to injunctions against state officials."280 The Supreme Court held that "'a federal district
court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.'"281 Additionally, the Steffel Court pointed out that
"when no state proceeding is pending and thus considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality,
the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request for injunctive
relief. "282 Indeed, "'different considerations enter into a
federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the one
hand, and injunctive relief, on the other.'"283
The "persuasive force of the court's opinion and judgment may lead state prosecutors, courts, and legislators to
reconsider their respective responsibilities toward the statute."284 Even though a declaratory judgment has the full
force and effect of a final judgment, "it is a milder form of
relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is
not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate but it is not contempt."285 Requiring federal

279. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466.
280. Id. at 467.
281. Id. at 468 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 254
(1943».
282. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.
283. Id. at 469 (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-55 (1967» (emphasis in original).
284. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 470.
285. [d. at 471. Some might argue that a federal court should never enjoin
enforcement of a state court injunction because a federal injunction against a
state injunction might create a scenario where state police, prosecutors or judges could be held in contempt for enforcing the state court order. However, constitutional rights must not be abandoned simply because the enforcement officials might be punished for enforcing an unconstitutional injunction. Moreover,
as noted in Steffel, declaratory relief is an alternative remedy which must be
separately considered from the request for irijunctive relief. Declaratory relief is
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courts to step aside in situations where the plaintiff is not a
party to any state civil or criminal prosecution "would turn
federalism on its head."286 Therefore, according to Steffel,
"regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate,
federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state
prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a
genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal
statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality
of the statute on its face or as applied. "287
C. The Application of Rooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to the
facts of Cheffer because the federal plaintiff did not attempt
to use the federal forum as an appellate court over the state
forum. Cheffer was not a party to the ongoing state action
and therefore did not have the opportunity to appeal the
state court decision. "The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not
apply to bar suit in federal court brought by a party that
was not a party in the preceding action in the state
COurt."286 Indeed, the Third Circuit in Valenti noted that it
could find "no authority which would extend the Rooker-

a much milder remedy than injunctive relief. Whereas noncompliance with an
injunction may result in contempt, noncompliance with a declaratory judgment
does not result in contempt. At a minimum, a federal plaintiff should be afforded declaratory relief in the right circumstances.
286. [d. at 472.
287. [d. at 475. All too often federal courts treat injunctive and declaratory
relief as a single issue. When a federal plaintiff fails to meet the criteria for
injunctive relief, courts frequently deny both injunctive and declaratory relief in
the same sentence without separate analysis. There are many cases where a
federal plaintiff might not meet the threshold for injunctive relief but should
still be awarded declaratory relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff
generally must prove: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
harm; (3) the harm to the plaintiff greatly outweighs the harm to the defendant and granting the relief is in the public interest; and (4) no adequate remedy at law. Declaratory relief requires none of the four criteria for injunctive
relief. Violation of an injunction may result in contempt but not so with declaratory relief. While an injunction must be complied with, declaratory relief is
advisory. The difference between an injunction and declaratory relief is like the
difference between a command and hortatory advice.
288. U.S. v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Valenti v.
Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992).
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Feldman doctrine to persons not parties to the proceedings
before the state supreme court. "289

D. The Application of Brillhart
The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine applies only to circumstances involving a federal suit addressing state issues
under the Declaratory Judgment Act with parties who are
also parties to a pending parallel state proceeding.290
Brillhart clearly does not apply to the facts of Cheffer. First,
consistent with the theme underlying the various aspects of
absention, Cheffer was not a party to a pending state court
proceeding. Second, Cheffer dealt with federal constitutional
questions rather than state law. Third, Cheffer was not parallel to the state proceeding because it dealt with the application of the injunction to non-parties through the "in concert" provision, while the state case dealt with the application of the injunction to parties based on past history. 291
Finally, while the federal plaintiff in Cheffer requested declaratory relief, she also requested injunctive relief.
E. The Application of Colorado River

The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine applies only
when substantially the same parties are litigating substantially the same issues in state court. Colorado River does not
apply to the facts of Cheffer for two reasons. First, Cheffer
was not a party to the state court action. There is no obligation that Cheffer attempt to intervene in the ongoing state
proceeding in order to vindicate her rights. Second, the issues between the state and federal court, while similar, are
not substantially identical. The state court parties litigated
the underlying issue of the constitutionality of the injunction. That issue obviously involved questions of law and fact.
The questions of fact revolved around whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the imposition of an injunc-

289. Valenti, 962 F.2d at 297-98.
290. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); see also
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
291. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (1994).
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tion. The questions of law revolved around whether the
injunction exceeded constitutional protections. Moreover, the
litigation in the state court proceeding involved the parties
and their past actions. The litigation in the federal court
involved only the application of the "in concert" provision
which the state parties would not have standing to raise. 292
Because Cheffer is not a party to the ongoing state action, and since her concern was focused on the application of
the "in concert" provision to non-parties, the concerns raised
in her complaint were not substantially similar to those
litigated by the parties to the state court action. Therefore,
the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of the Abstention Doctrine is to preserve the balance between state and federal sovereignty. The
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from issuing an
injunction against a state proceeding except as expressly
authorized by Congress or where necessary to aid its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment. Civil rights
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are specifically excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act. First Amendment
claims are therefore not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine is only applicable
when the federal court is faced with an ambiguous state law
susceptible to multiple meanings, one of which may prove
the statute constitutional and the other may render it unconstitutional. Pullman does not apply when the state law is
clear and unambiguous. Moreover, Pullman does not apply
when the state courts have interpreted the state law, and
may not apply where the state courts have had the opportunity to interpret the state law but have failed or refused to
do so. Pullman should never apply to a state-ordered injunction because, by its very nature, the state court created the
challenged law.

292. See id. Named parties do not have standing to challenge an "in concert"
provision since, by nature of that provision, it applies to non-parties.
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The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply when
there is no pending state proceeding against the federal
plaintiff at the time the federal complaint is filed. The
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies only to those
circumstances where the federal plaintiff attempts to use the
federal forum as an appellate court over a state court action.
In other words, if a federal plaintiff begins an action in state
court, receives a decision from the state court, and instead of
appealing through the state court system, ceases the state
action and presents the identical claim in federal court, the
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies. RookerFeldman is only concerned with the federal plaintiff who begins in the state court system and fails to exhaust the state
court appellate process. The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine
applies only to circumstances involving a federal suit addressing state issues under the Declaratory Judgment Act
with parties who are also parties to a pending parallel state
proceeding. The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is not
applicable when substantially the same parties are not litigating substantially the same issue in a state forum. Colorado River is inapplicable if the state proceedings have terminated or if the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state
court action.
One common thread underlying all of the doctrines of
abstention is that abstention does not apply to a federal
plaintiff who has never been a party to a state court action.
Moreover, abstention does not apply to a federal plaintiff
when there is no pending proceeding in state court against
the federal plaintiff on the same issue as long as the federal
plaintiff is not attempting to use the federal forum as an
appellate court over an unsuccessful partial journey through
the state court system. A plaintiff has the right to choose
either the state or federal forum to raise constitutional
claims. The Abstention Doctrine cannot be used to force a
federal plaintiff to first seek redress in a state court by either filing a complaint there, intervening in another state
court action, or filing an amicus brief in a pending state
court proceeding. Despite the fact that a similar federal
question is pending in a state court action, the federal plain-
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tiff may still seek redress in a federal forum as long as the
federal plaintiff is not a party to the ongoing state action.
The purpose of the Abstention Doctrine is to balance
state and federal sovereignty. According to the Supreme
Court, the federal courts are supposed to act as the guardians of federal rights. Federal courts have therefore been
expressly authorized to issue injunctions as a means of redress. Therefore, except in rare circumstances where the
balance between state and federal comity would be substantially upset, federal courts should not step aside from protecting federal rights.
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